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ABSTRACT 
The process of tax recovery is a significant and necessary one. However, it is also fraught 
with complexities and controversy. The State has enacted laws to facilitate the efficient 
collection of taxes.  
When it comes to the various stringent tax laws in the South African tax system aimed at 
ensuring the efficient collection of taxes, the ‘pay now, argue later’ rule is certainly a 
contender. The practical impact of the rule is that neither the noting of an objection nor an 
appeal suspends a taxpayer’s pre-existing obligation to pay tax. The provisions of the Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011 contain wide powers that are conferred upon the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS). These provisions in conjunction with the rule are the 
catalysts through which taxpayers’ co-operation with SARS is achieved. 
It is therefore not surprising that the State may enact and execute its laws in a manner so as 
to effectively achieve its tax collection mandate, whilst not having sufficient regard to the 
rights of taxpayers. The purpose of this mini dissertation is to engage in a critical discussion 
of the ‘pay now, argue later’ rule and to show the need to ameliorate the effect of the powers 
bestowed upon SARS in order to ensure better protection of taxpayers’ rights. There is a 
need to create better awareness of taxpayers’ rights and for tax legislation to be a lot more 
understandable and unambiguous in the interest of creating certainty for taxpayers, SARS 
and the courts. 
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DEFINITIONS, MEANINGS AND ACRONYMS  
‘assessment’1 means the determination of the amount of tax liability or refund, by way of 
self-assessment by the taxpayer or assessment by SARS. 
‘Commissioner’2 means the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
appointed in terms of section 6 of the SARS Act or the Acting Commissioner designated in 
terms of section 7 of that Act. 
‘Constitution’ means the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
 ‘Income Tax Act’ means the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
‘PAJA’ means the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
 ‘return’3 means a form, declaration, document or other manner of submitting information 
to SARS that incorporates a self-assessment, is a basis on which an assessment is to be made 
by SARS or incorporates relevant material required under section 25, 26 or 27 or a provision 
under a tax Act requiring the submission of a return. 
‘SARS Act’ means the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997. 
‘SARS’ means the South African Revenue Service, established under the South African 
Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997. 
 ‘Tax Administration Act’ means Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
‘tax’,4 for purposes of administration under this Act, includes a tax, duty, levy, royalty, fee, 
contribution, penalty, interest and any other moneys imposed under a tax Act. 
‘VAT Act’ means the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991.  
                                                          
1 Section 1 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTIION 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
‘We do not like to talk about burdens and duties these days and much prefer to talk about rights. 
Nevertheless it is still relatively novel to talk about taxpayers’ rights.’1 
The purpose of law in society, fiscal laws inclusive, is to promote legal order and to eradicate 
anarchy and chaos.2  As a result, various laws have been promulgated to enable governments 
to impose taxes on their citizens.3  Taxation is no modern notion. It dates back several centuries 
to ancient civilisations.4  
In the South African jurisdiction, the various taxes that are currently imposed on the citizenry 
include Income Tax, Value Added Tax (VAT), Customs Duties, Capital Gains Tax, Dividends 
Tax, Donations Tax, Estate Duty, Excise Duty, Transfer Duty.5  Reference to taxes for purposes 
of this dissertation will be confined to income tax and VAT. Income tax is the normal tax levied 
on a person’s taxable income and profit whereas VAT is levied as a result of the consumption 
of goods and services in the country’s economy.6  The charging statutes for income tax and 
VAT are the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereinafter, the ‘Income Tax Act’) and the Value-
Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (hereinafter, the ‘VAT Act’), respectively. Tax administration in 
respect of both taxes occurs in terms of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereinafter, 
the ‘Tax Administration Act’). The purpose behind the enactment of the Tax Administration 
Act was to consolidate into a single piece of legislation the administration provisions that were 
found in the various tax statutes.7  
SARS is the revenue authority in South Africa, which was established under the South African 
Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 (hereinafter, the ‘SARS Act’) as an organ of state within the 
public administration but outside the public service.8  At the outset, it is important to note that 
                                                          
1  Duncan Bentley (ed) Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective (1998) iii. 
2 L Olivier ‘Uncertainty Regarding the Philosophy Underlying South African Revenue Service Collection 
Procedures’ 2003 TSAR 382. 
3 B Croome & L Olivier Tax Administration (2010) 1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 SARS ‘What kinds of tax do we pay?’ available at www.sars.gov.za, accessed on 02 August 2018. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Section 2 of the Tax Administration Act. 
8 Ibid. 
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taxes are not imposed by SARS, but by operation of law.9 SARS is simply an organ of state 
mandated to collect taxes.10 
The following have been identified as the major objectives of taxation, namely, to enable the 
government to pay for its expenditure, to enable same to redistribute and to reallocate its 
resources and to ensure the smooth economic running of the country.11  In addition, one of the 
key justifications for the levying of taxes is that it is a necessary sacrifice in order to attain the 
kind of society that is desired by its members.12  It is further submitted that those who enjoy 
the benefits of the state are liable to pay taxes to the state.13  Thus, an obligation is placed on 
every person who becomes liable to pay any tax to register with SARS as a taxpayer.14 
Notwithstanding the evidently legitimate purposes and justifications for taxation, it has been 
the subject of diverse views and opinions in various disciplines, ranging from economics to 
politics and ethics.15   Albert Einstein candidly stated that ‘the hardest thing to understand in 
the world is the income tax’.16  Equally candid was Benjamin Franklin17 in his statement that 
‘in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes’. According to 
Williams,18 ‘to levy a tax is to confiscate the taxpayer’s money’. 
Given such views as these, it is little wonder that taxpayers and the revenue authority are 
frequently at loggerheads. It seems that the payment and collection of taxes is tantamount to a 
struggle in which SARS strives to collect a maximum amount of taxes on the one hand whilst 
taxpayers strive to pay a minimal amount on the other.19 A further observation is that that we 
do not live in an ideal society where taxpayers diligently fulfil their tax obligations; hence the 
seemingly draconian powers conferred upon SARS to ensure the efficient collection of taxes.20 
One such power is a highly daunting rule upon which the South African tax system is premised. 
It is colloquially termed the ‘pay now, argue later’ rule (hereinafter ‘the rule’). According to 
the rule, a taxpayer is obliged to first pay a tax amount demanded by SARS and only complain 
                                                          
9 Sections 3 and 4 of the SARS Act. 
10 Ibid. 
11 RC Williams Income Tax in South Africa: Law & Practice 4 ed (2006) 3. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 C Divaris & ML Stein South African Income Tax Guide 2010/2011 (2011) 1. 
15 Williams op cit note 11 at 3. 
16 Ibid at 2. 
17 D Howell ‘Death and taxes’ 2017 Tax Professional 24. 
18 Williams op cit note 11 at 2. 
19 Croome & Olivier op cit note 3 at (v). 
20 Olivier op cit note 2 at 382. 
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thereafter. It does not matter that a taxpayer disagrees with a tax amount reflected in his or her 
assessment and whether he or she has every intention of contesting it. The obligation to pay 
such tax amount remains intact. The rule is a trite principle in South African tax law and it is 
currently enshrined in the Tax Administration Act.21  The rule undoubtedly serves a pivotal 
role of ensuring the efficient collection of taxes to maintain a smooth economic running of the 
country.22  Nonetheless, it is the object of much resistance in the tax sphere, with the core issue 
being whether it can harmoniously co-exist with taxpayers’ rights.23 
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
First, unlike an ordinary tax debt, the payment of which is suspended until a debtor’s liability 
has been established by a court of law, SARS is permitted to collect a tax amount from a 
taxpayer, despite the amount being contested by the latter.24  This may potentially plunge a 
taxpayer into serious financial difficulty. 
Furthermore, the remedies at the taxpayer’s disposal do not seem to provide any significant 
protection because as briefly explained above, a taxpayer’s obligation to pay a disputed tax 
amount remains intact. SARS is empowered to proceed with the collection of a disputed tax 
amount, to the extent of obtaining a certified statement which is regarded as a civil judgment, 
and to subsequently attach a taxpayer’s property at a sale in execution. 
Another major reason why the rule is frowned upon is because it appears to be inconsistent 
with taxpayers’ rights as enshrined in the Constitution.25  The constitutional rights that are of 
particular significance in the tax sphere are the right to property,26 the right of access to the 
courts,27 the right to privacy,28 the right to equality,29 the right of access to information30 and 
the right to just administrative action.31 All the said constitutional rights, save for the right of 
access to the courts, are beyond the scope of this dissertation. There appears to be an imbalance 
                                                          
21 Section 164(1) of the Tax Administration Act. 
22 C Keulder‘“Pay now, argue later” rule – before and after the Tax Administration Act’ (2013) 16(4) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 125. 
23 Ibid. 
24 CIR v NCR Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 50 SATC 9. 
25 C Keulder Does the Constitution Protect Taxpayers Against the Mighty SARS? – An Inquiry into the 
Constitutionality of Selected Tax Practices and Procedures (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 
2011) II. 
26 Section 25 of the Constitution. 
27 Section 34 of the Constitution. 
28 Section 14 of the Constitution. 
29 Section 9 of the Constitution.  
30 Section 32 of the Constitution. 
31 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
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between the powers conferred upon SARS in the quest to collect taxes, and the need to protect 
taxpayers’ rights from the might of the State. This view is consistent with that of the Davis Tax 
Committee where it stated thus: 
It is common cause that, in balancing the powers and rights of tax authorities against those of 
taxpayers, there is a disproportionate bias of power and entitlement in favour of tax authorities. 
This is largely justified to ensure compliance, mainly by taxpayers who would rather not pay 
their fair share of taxes. This bias often overrides taxpayers’ rights, which are in most instances 
unknown to the taxpayers.32 
It appears that the law favours SARS at all costs in the quest to efficiently collect taxes, despite 
this being to the severe detriment of taxpayers. 
3. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a critical discussion of selected criticisms 
surrounding the rule, and to establish the extent to which the rule, given its high importance, 
can co-exist with the equally important rights of taxpayers. 
4. RATIONALE 
There is increasing tension between SARS and taxpayers. This is especially so because history 
has shown that taxpayers are often the unsuccessful litigants in tax disputes.33 A number of 
studies in this area focus on the constitutionality of the rule. Whilst a portion of this dissertation 
likewise includes a discussion on whether the rule can stand constitutional muster in respect of 
the right of access to the courts, this dissertation further entails a discussion of practical issues 
pertaining to tax administration in relation to the rule. It also entails a discussion of the 
controversial nature of selected specified powers conferred upon SARS in an effort to 
implement the rule. 
5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
5.1 What is the origin and the significance of the rule? 
5.2 What problems are caused by the operation of the rule that it attracts much controversy? 
5.3 How different is a tax debt from an ordinary civil debt? 
5.4 Is a certified statement tantamount to a judgment against a taxpayer? In this regard, to  
      what extent is the rule compatible with the constitutional right of access to the courts? 
                                                          
32 D Davis, D Tickle & T Legwaila Report on Tax Administration (2017) 63, available at www.taxcom.org.za, 
accessed on 13 June 2018. 
33 J Silke ‘Taxpayers and the Constitution: A battle already lost’ (2002) 17 Acta Juridica 282. 
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5.5 How adequate are the current remedies afforded to a taxpayer in view of the powers  
       conferred upon SARS? 
6. METHODOLOGY 
The study requires a discussion of the relevant law as set out in the relevant tax statutes and 
court judgements. The analysis and critique of the law shall be facilitated by useful information 
from textbooks, literature reviews in journal articles and periodicals, and any other published 
material that is available in the public domain. Thus, the methodology utilised for this work is 
documentary and desktop research.  
7. EXPOSITION 
 Chapter two will comprise a general discussion of the origin of the rule and its significance. It 
is investigated as to why the rule is so important and why the legislature is determined to 
enforce it at all costs. In addition, the chapter will engage in a discussion of specified statutory 
powers conferred upon SARS in conjunction with the rule, and the problems that this may 
cause for taxpayers. 
Chapter three will contain a critical analysis of the compatibility of the rule with a taxpayer’s 
right of access to the courts. The landmark constitutional court decision in Metcash Trading 
Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service,34 in which the court was tasked 
with deciding whether the rule could stand constitutional muster in the context of VAT, will 
be discussed. This chapter will also contain a discussion the nature of a tax debt as opposed to 
an ordinary civil debt. In addition, the chapter will contain an analysis of the implementation 
provisions of the rule, particularly section 174 of the Tax Administration Act. This section 
states that the certificate procedure which the Commissioner files with the clerk or registrar of 
a competent court, is regarded as a judgment lawfully obtained against a taxpayer. The chapter 
will engage in an analysis as to whether a certified statement is tantamount to a judgment.  
Chapter four will entail a discussion of the remedies made available to a taxpayer under the 
Tax Administration Act. This chapter will discuss the effectiveness of these remedies. The 
chapter will also discuss whether there are any other remedies, beside those contained in the 
Tax Administration Act, at the disposal of an aggrieved taxpayer. In addition, the chapter will 
comprise a discussion of the instances where the operation of the rule may be suspended. The 
                                                          
34 2001 1 BCLR 1 (CC). 
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Tax Administration Act does provide an aggrieved taxpayer with an opportunity to request for 
the suspension of the payment of disputed tax.  
Chapter five is the concluding chapter. The chapter provides an overview of the findings of 
this work and also contains some recommendations.
16 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE STATUTORY POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER AND THE IMPACT OF THE 
‘PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER’ RULE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
‘The pay-now-argue-later rule is probably the most invasive of a taxpayer’s rights’.1 
The lives of all citizens are affected by the practice of taxation.2  Income tax was introduced in 
the Union of South Africa in the year 1914 when General Smuts, who was the Minister of 
Finance then, tabled the Income Tax Act 28 of 1914 in Parliament.3  The said statute was 
largely based on the previous taxation systems, being the old Cape Colony and the New South 
Wales Act 11 of 1912.4  A prevailing notion in the historical development of taxation was that 
it was simply a way of government exercising its powers in order to maintain a stable society.5 
2. THE INCEPTION OF THE ‘PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER’ RULE IN SOUTH AFRICAN   
TAX LAW AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ITS OPERATION 
It was through the Income Tax Act that the rule had its advent in South African tax law, and 
later in the VAT Act.6  The rule in the Income Tax Act empowered SARS to proceed with the 
recovery of any tax from a taxpayer, notwithstanding the existence of an appeal by such 
taxpayer, unless the Commissioner directed to the contrary.7  Similarly, the VAT Act provided 
that save where the Commissioner directed otherwise, a VAT vendor who had lodged an appeal 
was still obliged to pay the VAT amount that was demanded by SARS.8  It is clear that the rule 
in both statutes, although dealing with different taxes, was substantially similar. Despite the 
lodging of an appeal by a taxpayer in any of the available forums, the rule required that a 
                                                          
1 RC Williams ‘The pay-now-argue-later rule festers into our income tax system’ South African Institute of Tax 
Professionals Technical 2 December 2011, available at http://www.thesait.org.za, accessed on 15 August 2018. 
2 J Hattingh, J Roeleveld & C West (eds) Income tax in South Africa: the first 100 years 1914- 2014 (2016) xiv. 
3 P Surtees ‘Importing and exporting income tax law: The international origins of the South African Income Tax 
Act’ in Johann Hattingh , Jennifer Roeleveld & Craig West (eds) Income tax in South Africa: the first 100 years 
1914- 2014 (2016) 15. 
4 Ibid. 
5 B Croome (ed) Tax Law: An Introduction (2013) 2. 
6 SK Elliot The “pay now, argue later” principle in South African Tax Law: its development, operation, 
comparison to South African civil debt enforcement and consistency with the constitutional right of access to 
courts (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017) 19. 
7 Section 88(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
8 Section 36(1) of the VAT Act. 
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contested tax amount still had to be paid over to SARS, the only exception being where the 
Commissioner directed to the contrary. 
As mentioned in chapter one, tax administration of the various taxes, save for Customs and 
Excise, now occurs under the Tax Administration Act.9  The rule has been retained in the Tax 
Administration Act.10  An apparent distinction in the rule under the Tax Administration Act is 
that the power to suspend payment of tax on request by a taxpayer now vests in a senior SARS 
official.11 Furthermore, the rule is now not only applicable to appeals but also to objections.12 
One of the canons of taxation according to Scottish economist, Adam Smith, is that of 
convenience.13 This canon requires, amongst other things, that the imposition of tax ought to 
be done at a time and manner that is to the taxpayer’s convenience.14 However, the rule and 
the notion of convenience are two concepts that are utterly divergent. The rule seems to be 
much to the delight of SARS and to the chagrin of taxpayers. The main objective behind the 
operation of the rule is to ensure that taxes are collected quickly and effectively as explained 
in chapter one. This was confirmed by Binns-Ward J in Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another15 where he stated that the operation 
of the rule is ‘in the public interest in obtaining full and speedy settlement of tax debts’ as well 
as to curb tax evasion. Thus, if the rule were not in operation, there would be a high prevalence 
of objections from taxpayers, frivolous and vexatious objections inclusive, which would stifle 
the economic progress of the State.16  The Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of the rule, albeit in the context of VAT.17 
3. THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF THE ‘PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER’ RULE 
According to Croome, the advent of the Tax Administration Act improved the relationship 
between taxpayers and SARS.18 On the other hand, however, it has been observed that the 
provisions of the Tax Administration Act have only served to widen the powers conferred upon 
                                                          
9 B Croome & L Olivier Tax Administration 2 ed (2015) 5. 
10 Section 164(1) of the Tax Administration Act. 
11 C Keulder‘“Pay now, argue later” rule – before and after the Tax Administration Act’ (2013) 16 PER/ PELJ 
148. 
12 Section 164(1) of the Tax Administration Act. 
13 Croome op cit note 5 at 10. 
14 Ibid. 
15 2011 (6) SA 65 (WCC) para 9. 
16 Keulder op cit note 11 at 127. 
17 Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2001 1 BCLR 1 (CC). 
18 Hattingh, Roeleveld & West op cit note 2 at 278. 
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SARS, with the major aim being to combat tax evasion.19 However, the extensive powers 
conferred upon SARS apply not only to tax evaders but also to taxpayers who faithfully 
discharge their tax obligations, with the result that the latter may suffer prejudice in the 
process.20  Furthermore, the poor economic state of the country owing, inter alia, to the rising 
inflation and interest rates, soaring poverty levels and persistent unemployment does not place 
taxpayers in a financially viable situation, much less when they are compelled to pay tax 
amounts that they dispute.21 Moreover, a taxpayer’s failure to comply first and complain later 
may give rise to dire consequences under the Tax Administration Act, such as a certified 
statement being filed against such taxpayer, which statement is regarded as a civil judgement 
for purposes of tax recovery.22 Thereafter, the Commissioner is able to acquire a writ of 
execution by which a taxpayer’s property can be attached and sold.23 Specified statutory 
powers conferred upon the Commissioner are discussed hereunder. 
(a) Jeopardy Assessments 
As explained in chapter one, once a person becomes liable for any tax, an obligation arises for 
such a person to register with SARS as a taxpayer.24  Thereafter, the person is required to 
submit tax returns in terms of which liability for tax is determined and an assessment issued.25 
However, section 94 of the Tax Administration Act empowers SARS to issue an assessment to 
a taxpayer ahead of time before the taxpayer submits a tax return. This is to enable SARS to 
secure a tax debt that would otherwise be difficult to secure at a later stage. Although a taxpayer 
who finds themselves in such a situation is afforded the remedy of judicial review, it is accepted 
that this statutory power conferred upon SARS is manifestly drastic.26 
(b) The impact of a certified statement on a taxpayer’s creditworthiness 
A prospective creditor usually determines whether or not to have confidence in a prospective 
debtor based on the latter’s creditworthiness.27 Creditworthiness refers to a trait that a debtor 
                                                          
19 M Seligson ‘Previewing the new Tax Administration Act: more muscle for SARS – taxpayers beware!’ (2012) 
3 Business Tax and Company Law Quarterly 4. 
20 Ibid. 
21 The South African Institute of Tax Professionals ‘Annexure C Proposals for 2018 Budget’, available at 
www.thesait.org.za, accessed on 28 July 2018. 
22 Sections 172 and 174 of the Tax Administration Act. 
23 Keulder op cit note 11at 129. 
24 Lynette Olivier ‘Law of Taxation’ 2003 Annual Survey of South African Law 935. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ben Johannes ‘Pay now, argue later – principle: when must you pay SARS?’ 2016 TAXtalk 28. 
27 HB Klopper ‘The Nature of Creditworthiness’ (1992) 55 THRHR 19. 
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possesses which influences the decision of a prospective creditor on whether or not to proceed 
to deal with such a debtor.28  The trait is none other than the faithfulness of a debtor in 
honouring their financial obligations, specifically whether they have the same enthusiasm in 
settling their debts as they do in applying for credit.29 This is done through the collection of 
data of the person’s financial affairs.30 
Entities such as credit bureaus, credit record agencies and companies constantly gather and sell 
data pertaining to the creditworthiness of individuals and businesses.31 The collected data 
includes judgements that have been obtained against a person which involve for instance, 
garnishee orders, liquidations or sequestrations.32  Thus, if the Commissioner obtains a certified 
statement against a taxpayer, this can have a detrimental impact on the taxpayer as his or her 
creditworthiness may be affected.33  Generally, the first time that a taxpayer becomes aware of 
the existence of the statement is when he or she tries to apply for a loan, for instance.34 
(c)  Liquidation, sequestration or winding-up of a taxpayer’s estate 
Another far-reaching consequence of failure by an aggrieved taxpayer to comply first with the 
rule is the risk of having their estate liquidated, sequestrated or in extreme circumstances, 
wound-up.35  Section 177(1) of the Tax Administration Act enables SARS to commence with 
liquidation, sequestration or winding-up proceedings against a defaulting taxpayer. This power 
which previously vested in the Commissioner under the Income Tax Act,36 now vests in a 
senior SARS official under the Tax Administration Act. Once the liquidation or sequestration 
process is complete, SARS then proceeds to prove its claim in accordance with the provisions 
of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (hereinafter the ‘Insolvency Act’). 
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In Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd,37 the 
respondent purported to raise the argument that the rule did not operate in the case of liquidation 
or sequestration proceedings against a taxpayer.38 
The facts were that assessments had been issued against a company, Hawker Air Services and 
its former partners in respect of VAT debts that had been incurred under a previous 
partnership.39  The partnership had conducted an air charter business and had made use of two 
aircrafts.40  Both aircrafts had been bought and imported from a foreign company, Ben Navis, 
in the Virgin Islands.41 Upon importation into South Africa, SARS agreed not to levy the 
relevant tax on condition that the aircrafts’ usage be confined to commercial purposes in the 
running of the partnership business.42  When a subsequent investigation by SARS revealed that 
the conditions had been breached and that the aircrafts were often used for private purposes by 
the director of Hawker Air Services, it issued VAT assessments against Hawker Air Services 
and its former partners and eventually instituted liquidation and sequestration proceedings 
against Hawker Air Services and the previous partnership, respectively.43 
The court rejected the argument, reasoning that the invocation of liquidation or sequestration 
proceedings is simply one of the various powers conferred upon SARS to facilitate the effective 
enforcement and collection of taxes.44 According to the court, Hawker Air Services had no 
‘reasonable and bona fide’ grounds for opposing SARS’s applications.45  The court found that 
the evidence clearly confirmed SARS’s findings that the aircrafts were predominantly used for 
private purposes in defiance of the conditions that had been initially imposed.46  Thus, the court 
found that Hawker Air Services was liable for the debts of the partnership.47 Since the initial 
partnership had no assets to satisfy the tax liability, the court held that a winding-up order was 
justified.48 
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 Upon the establishment of the validity of its claim, SARS takes preference over other creditors 
in terms of the Insolvency Act.49 This was demonstrated in Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service v Stand Two Nine Nought Wynberg (Pty) Ltd and Others.50 A company, MMW, had 
taken over the assets of another company, Super Diamond, shortly after the latter had been 
liquidated.51  MMW had not rendered payment to Super Diamond.52 Prior to the liquidator’s 
investigation as regards MMW’s conduct, MMW entered into an agreement in which it bound 
itself to pay an amount of money to Super Diamond as well as to pay the liquidator an amount 
of money to settle the claims of Super Diamond’s creditors.53  However, MMW was unable to 
settle the claims of all Super Diamond’s creditors and was itself subsequently wound up.54  One 
of MMW’s creditors was SARS and it was regarded as a preferential creditor by the liquidator 
in terms of the Insolvency Act, and consequently had to be paid first.55 One of the concurrent 
creditors lodged an objection with the Master of the High Court on the basis that irrespective 
of the preferential claim, the amount of money was initially paid by MMW to be given to the 
concurrent creditor.56 Thus, the creditor argued that it was entitled to a direct payment in 
respect thereof.57 The objection was refused.58 
The court held that it is not permissible for a debtor of an insolvent estate to enter into an 
agreement with the liquidator in terms of which an amount should be paid to a particular 
creditor.59  Rather, the liquidator was obliged to adhere to the scheme of distribution enshrined 
in the Insolvency Act.60 The concurrent creditor argued that by agreeing to the initial 
arrangement, the liquidator had in essence become the agent of the concurrent creditor.61 In 
response, the court held that it is settled law that the same person can only be the agent of 
distinct principals where no conflict of duties arises.62  Thus, the liquidator was bound to a 
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prior arrangement only to the extent that it was in harmony with his obligations under the 
Insolvency Act.63 Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal.64 
In this case SARS was identified as a preferential creditor as is clear from the Insolvency Act. 
Consequently, any prior arrangements in an attempt to favour other creditors and which are in 
conflict with the Insolvency Act cannot stand. This is another example of the strong powers 
conferred upon SARS by the legislature. However, SARS’ powers are not without restriction 
in this regard. 
In Union Government v Milne,65 estimated assessments were issued to the taxpayer in the tax 
year of 1947. The assessments were in respect of tax for the preceding five years prior to 1947 
plus penalties.66  The tax was incurred through the buying and selling of shares.67 Whilst the 
taxpayer had objected to the assessments, he still attempted to make a payment arrangement 
with the Commissioner, pending the outcome of the objection.68  The Commissioner, whilst 
not waiving the right to recovery of the tax, decided to entertain the possibility of such an 
arrangement on condition that the taxpayer submitted a certified statement confirming his 
financial standing for consideration.69  In addition, the taxpayer had submitted a declaration in 
which he had consented to the Commissioner overseeing his banking transactions70 and the 
momentary control of his assets.71 One look at the taxpayer’s statement is all it took for the 
Commissioner to not only decline the objection, but also to launch provisional sequestration 
proceedings against the taxpayer.72  This was as a result of the Commissioner’s discovery that 
the taxpayer’s liabilities exceeded his assets.73 In the Commissioner’s view, the submitted 
financial statement was tantamount to an act of insolvency.74 
The court was persuaded by the taxpayer’s argument that no material facts had been advanced 
by the Commissioner and that a mere statement did not constitute an act of insolvency.75  The 
court confirmed that the lodging of an appeal did not preclude the Commissioner from utilising 
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any of the collection mechanisms that were allowed to him under the relevant statute.76  
However, the court reasoned that the taxpayer’s appeal, in which he argued that he had not 
committed an act of insolvency, could not be ignored.77  This is because it was possible that 
the outcome of the appeal would have been favourable to the taxpayer.78  If the court had given 
a final sequestration order, and the appeal turned out successful, the sequestration of the 
taxpayer’s estate would still have proceeded.79  The court held that the results of such an order 
would undoubtedly be dire.80 Thus, the court held that unless ‘clear proof’ is given by the 
Commissioner of the taxpayer’s insolvency, it could not grant a final sequestration order.81 
The court further rejected the Commissioner’s contention that the taxpayer’s conduct was an 
indication of an inability to pay since the taxpayer had submitted an objection.82  The court 
held that the objection meant that he disputed the assessed amounts, and not that he was unable 
to pay them.83  The court applied the same reasoning to the taxpayer’s undertakings on the 
basis that he sought to make arrangements pending the outcome of the objection, and not 
because he was unable to pay.84  The court held that despite the statement and the undertakings, 
nowhere had the taxpayer admitted inability to pay.85 Rather, the taxpayer had hoped that the 
objection and communication with the Commissioner would create favourable results.86 Thus, 
the court declined to grant a final order and also set the provisional order aside.87 
It can be inferred from the above case that the mere fact that SARS is empowered to institute 
sequestration proceedings and is ranked above other creditors does not guarantee its success if 
it does not furnish the court with evidence of actual insolvency of a taxpayer. It seems that each 
case would be decided on its own merits. This is evidenced by the court’s reference to 
Union Bank of SA v Fainman88 in which the inability to pay was established based on the 
contents of an unambiguous document. Despite the court’s reference to 
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Union Bank of SA v Fainman, the court held that the facts of that case were distinct from this 
case and held that in the case at hand, insolvency had not been proven.  
Croome and Olivier89 observe that attempts by taxpayers to impugn SARS’s authority to 
sequestrate have often proved ineffectual. They suggest that a better alternative is for taxpayers 
in such a situation to consider entering into honest and meaningful communication and 
negotiations with SARS.90  Moreover, in practice SARS generally commences with liquidation 
proceedings as a final option where there has been a lack of co-operation from a defaulting 
taxpayer.91 
(d)  Appointment of a third party as a taxpayer’s agent 
The wide powers conferred upon SARS in the Tax Administration Act in order to effectively 
implement the rule go as far as permitting the appointment of a third party as the agent of a 
defaulting taxpayer where such third party is holding funds on a taxpayer’s behalf.92 The 
appointed agent is then obliged to pay over the funds to SARS in an attempt to settle the 
taxpayer’s tax liability.93 The Income Tax Act and the VAT Act formerly contained similar 
provisions.94 An example of a third party that may be appointed as a taxpayer’s agent is a 
banking institution with which the former has an account.95 As would be expected, this 
provision is no stranger to controversy. The ensuing discussion is aimed at analysing some of 
the key judgements in this regard. 
 In Hindry v Nedcor Bank and Another,96 the taxpayer was the managing director of a company 
which was responsible for deducting employees’ tax and paying it over to the revenue 
authority. The company had deducted tax from the taxpayer’s salary, who was a provisional 
taxpayer,97 both for the particular tax year as well as provisional tax for the subsequent 1987 
and 1989 tax years.98 It later transpired that the company had mistakenly paid as part of the 
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taxpayer’s provisional tax payment, an excess amount of tax to the revenue authority.99  
Schedule 4 of the Income Tax Act provided that in such circumstances, the taxpayer was 
entitled to a refund which included interest.100 It was subsequently discovered that the IRP5 
certificates that had been received from the taxpayer’s company were erroneous, with the result 
that an excessive refund was paid to the taxpayer.101 When instructed by the revenue authority 
to repay the excess amounts, the taxpayer lodged an objection instead.102 As a result of a lack 
of co-operation from the taxpayer, the Commissioner acting in terms of section 99 of the 
Income Tax Act, decided to appoint the taxpayer’s bank as his agent.103 
In the court a quo, the taxpayer successfully sought a temporary interdict to bar his bank from 
making any payments to the revenue authority.104 He further argued that the provision did not 
afford him a hearing prior to the notice being sent to his bankers, and neither had he been made 
aware as regards the reasons for the issuing of the notice.105  Thus, the taxpayer argued that his 
rights to access to the courts, just administrative action and privacy had been violated.106 
The court a quo held that in terms of the Income Tax Act, a refund that was erroneously paid 
to a taxpayer was recoverable as if it were a tax.107  The court found that there had been 
sufficient communication between the revenue authority and the taxpayer in which the former 
had given reasons for its actions.108 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court per Ackermann J, confirmed that the lodging of an 
objection does not stay the pre-existing obligation to pay tax.109  The court held that just as is 
the case with an ordinary civil debt, the appointment of an agent is likewise a form of garnishee 
order.110 According to the court, the taxpayer’s bank was in the position of a garnishee, despite 
the duty of confidentiality owed by the bank to the taxpayer regarding the latter’s affairs.111 
The only difference between the recovery of an ordinary civil debt and the recovery of a tax 
through the appointment of an agent is that the latter process does not require a court 
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judgement.112  The court held that the taxpayer had failed to show valid reasons upon which he 
would have objected to the garnishee order.113 Ackermann J continued that it would defeat the 
purpose of the provision if the taxpayer were to be given prior notice regarding the appointment 
of an agent.114 This is because in all likelihood, the taxpayer would try to prevent the 
prospective agent from transferring funds to the revenue authority.115 The court upheld the 
constitutionality of the provision on the basis that the said rights were justifiably limited under 
the limitation clause.116 
In Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd & others v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Services and others,117 the first applicant’s business was that of an administrative agent for a 
number of contract workers. Subsequent to being appointed by the Commissioner to exercise 
certain powers in terms of the VAT Act and Income Tax Act, a chartered accountant of SARS 
had applied for a search warrant to facilitate the search for certain documents in order to 
ascertain whether the applicant’s business operations were in line with the said statutes.118 The 
accountant found that a considerable amount of financial data was unavailable at the applicant’s 
premises.119 A further search at the applicants’ storage premises revealed the sought after 
financial data pertaining to the years of 1989 to 1998.120  VAT assessments were subsequently 
issued and the first applicant’s bank and certain of its clients and customers were appointed as 
the applicant’s agents under section 47 of the VAT Act.121  The appointment had occurred 
before the notice of assessments had taken place.122  The applicants objected to the 
assessments123 and sought, inter alia, a declaratory order setting aside the appointments.124 
They argued that they should have been afforded an antecedent hearing before the notice of 
appointment was given out in order to comply with the audi alteram partem principle.125 
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The court acknowledged the significance of the principle as a part of natural justice126 but held 
that there are certain situations that do not require compliance with it.127 According to the court, 
the appointment of an agent was one such situation.128  The court reasoned that an antecedent 
hearing would nullify the objective of the provision as it would enable the taxpayer to 
dispossess the prospective agent of the funds.129  According to the court, therefore, the principle 
was not violated.130 Rather, the statutory provision excluded its applicability.131  The court 
further held that liability to pay VAT is self-assessed and is not dependent upon the issuing of 
an assessment by SARS.132  Consequently, the court found that in the context of VAT, the 
appointment of an agent before issuing a notice of assessment was lawful.133  Thus, the court 
declined to set aside the appointments and confirmed that the objection did not stay the pre-
existing obligation on the applicant to pay the VAT.134 
Thus, the court in Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd & others v Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Services and others135 shared the same reasoning as the Constitutional Court 
in Hindry v Nedcor Bank and Another.136  Both held that it was not necessary to give a taxpayer 
a hearing before an agent was appointed on their behalf in order to achieve the purpose for 
which the power was conferred upon SARS. 
However, in Mpande Foodliner CC v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service137 the 
learned judge held a different view. In casu, Mabuza had started a business, which was a close 
corporation (‘the corporation’).138  Being a general dealer, he together with other general 
dealers started a company, T, figuring that their commercial advantage would be boosted as a 
team in a company, as opposed to being individual general dealers.139 A tender was 
subsequently awarded to T by the Mpumalanga Provincial Government to run a feeding scheme 
for certain schools in the area.140  However, T began to encounter financial problems and there 
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was a sharp decline in its turnover.141  Acting upon the advice given to it, T’s directors resolved 
to cede the feeding scheme to the corporation as it had the infrastructure to continue with the 
scheme.142  T was eventually liquidated.143  The corporation continued with the scheme and 
was awaiting its payment when SARS, without notice, appointed the Provincial Government 
as agent for VAT that was due by T.144  Upon being approached by Mabuza, SARS explained 
that the reason for its actions was that it appeared that T, in an attempt to avoid paying VAT, 
had transferred the funds to the corporation.145 Mabuza in response explained to SARS what 
had transpired that had led to the decision of the cession, emphasising that the two were distinct 
entities.146 
A number of issues required determination by the court, including whether a prior hearing was 
necessary before the appointment of an agent had occurred.147 The court found that upon 
discovery that T and the corporation were indeed distinct entities, the relevant SARS officials 
had admitted their mistaken impression.148  The court held that the relevant SARS officials had 
obtained clarity of the facts and yet refused to refund the corporation its money.149 According 
to the court, SARS’s conduct was not within the powers allowed to it under the VAT Act and 
found that its application of section 47 was unlawful in the circumstances.150  
The court further held that the audi alteram partem principle is settled in our law.151  The court 
declined to follow the precedent set by Hindry v Nedcor Bank and Another152 on the basis that 
a different statutory provision was at issue in that case and that the facts of the two cases were 
distinct.153 According to the court, a prior hearing was necessary in the circumstances.154  Patel 
AJ likewise disagreed with the ruling in Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd & others v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and others,155 reasoning that the audi 
alteram partem principle was too important not to be applied regardless of the circumstances156 
                                                          
141 Supra note 137 para 7. 
142 Supra note 137 para 7. 
143 Supra note 137 para 7. 
144 Supra note 137 para 8. 
145 Supra note 137 para 11. 
146 Supra note 137 para 9. 
147 Supra note 137 para 19. 
148 Supra note 137 para 34. 
149 Supra note 137 para 34. 
150 Supra note 137 para 35. 
151 Supra note 137 para 37. 
152 Supra note 96. 
153 Supra note 137 para 40. 
154 Supra note 137 para 40. 
155 Supra note 117. 
156 Supra note 137 para 42. 
29 
 
and despite the implication created by an empowering provision.157 He explained that a 
limitation is only permissible under the Constitutional limitation clause.158 Thus, the court 
found for the corporation and rendered the appointment unlawful, thereby setting it aside.159 
It is clear that the provision seems to attract a common grievance amongst taxpayers namely, 
the absence of a prior hearing before it is invoked. Patel AJ emphasised the importance of the 
audi alteram partem principle, thereby declining to follow the precedent set by the prior 
judgements discussed above. 
Cameron J in Industrial Manpower Projects (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue Vereeniging and 
Others160 was therefore faced with conflicting precedents in relation to the same issue of 
whether a prior hearing is necessary before an agent is appointed. In casu a VAT assessment 
had been issued to a close corporation, IMI CC, for an amount of over R7 million.161  When 
IMI CC was in corporate form initially, it had had a predecessor, a private company.162  SARS 
then proceeded to appoint IMI CC’s creditors as its agents under section 47 of the VAT Act.163 
IMI CC applied to court to have the appointments set aside and also sought that section 47 be 
declared unconstitutional.164 SARS contended that the company was involved in fraud as was 
evidenced by its failure to make certain declarations to SARS.165 According to SARS, the 
company had operated its business under various entities, behind which it had hid as a ploy to 
avoid paying tax.166  
The court found that there was irrefutable evidence to support the presence of fraud as the court 
was satisfied that the company had indeed not conducted its affairs in good faith.167 Cameron 
J then referred to the prior judgments discussed above.168  The court declined to deal with the 
question of whether the appointment provision excluded the right to a prior hearing in all 
circumstances.169  It was content with the reasoning in Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd & 
others v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and others and rejected that of 
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Patel AJ in Mpande Foodliner CC v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service.170  The 
court also distinguished the facts of Mpande Foodliner CC v Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service from those of this case, deeming a prior hearing unnecessary in this case.171  
According to the court, it was important to omit the prior hearing in order to enable SARS to 
put an end to the ongoing fraudulent operations of the company.172  The court highlighted the 
significance of the appointment provision in ensuring that SARS recovers taxes that are payable 
to it.173  However, the court explained that the provision could only be invoked in respect of 
tax or other payments that were payable to SARS.174 In this regard the court held that a taxpayer 
was still entitled to their usual remedies of objection and appeal.175 
The majority of authority, therefore, supports the view that taxpayers are not entitled to a prior 
hearing before agents are appointed on their behalf for purposes of collecting taxes and related 
payments by SARS.  
In Smartphone SP (Pty Ltd) v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another,176 the court was faced with the 
issue of whether an assessment had to be issued before an agent could be appointed. A 
company, Smartphone, had sold its business to the taxpayer.177 At the time that the taxpayer 
had taken over the business, four of Smartphone’s directors remained as directors although new 
directors joined the business at a later stage.178 It was subsequently discovered upon an 
investigation by SARS that Smartphone had operated a fraudulent scheme and had defrauded 
SARS and benefited in the amount of R19 million.179  Acting in terms of s 40(2)(a) of the VAT 
act, SARS obtained a certified statement and a copy of the civil judgment was delivered at the 
taxpayer’s principle place of business.180  The Commissioner was convinced that the taxpayer 
had also benefited from the fraud.181 SARS also relied on the fact that four of Smartphone’s 
directors remained in the business and were also the directors of the taxpayer.182 As a result, 
SARS appointed the taxpayer’s bank as agent in order to recover the tax that was owed to it.183  
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It was the taxpayer’s contention that SARS had neither informed it of any tax due nor had it 
issued to it an assessment in respect thereof.184 
In the court a quo, Cloete JA and Heher AJA found for the taxpayer on the grounds that section 
40 required a certified statement to be obtained on the basis of an assessment that had been 
issued.185 Since no assessment had been issued, it was the court’s view that the statement 
procedure could not be validly invoked.186 The court a quo based its decision on Singh v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service187 in which it was held that an assessment 
must precede the utilisation of the statement procedure. 
The appeal court held that once the notice was issued to the taxpayer’s bank, the latter was 
obliged by law to simply act in accordance with it on pain of specified penalties.188  The bank 
was not empowered to challenge the lawfulness thereof.189 Thus, the court dismissed the 
taxpayer’s submission that the bank should have verified the notice’s validity.190 
The court stated that the facts in Singh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
were distinct from this case.191 With reference to the preceding judgments of Mpande 
Foodliner CC v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service.192 and Contract Support 
Services (Pty) Ltd & others v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and 
others,193 the court agreed with the latter’s position in holding that an antecedent notice would 
nullify the objective of the provision.194 As stated in the facts, the court found that a notice of 
assessment had in fact been issued to Smartphone.195 As the court ruled out the possibility of 
possible prejudice, the court held that there was no need to issue an additional notice of 
assessment.196  The court also held the view that VAT is a self-assessing system of tax in terms 
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of which a vendor bears the duty of ensuring that the correct amount of VAT is paid.197 
According to the court, liability for VAT arose before an assessment was issued by SARS.198 
Despite the manifestly wide powers conferred upon SARS in this regard, section 179 of the 
Tax Administration Act makes it clear that the provisions can only be validly invoked if the 
prospective agent holds funds on the taxpayer’s behalf or where a prospective agent owes such 
taxpayer money. Section 47 of the VAT Act contained a similar stipulation as seen in some of 
the above cases. 
In Desai v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,199 Desai had loaned money and property to a 
family member, Ahmed, to enable the latter to start his own business. At a later stage, Desai 
had registered as a VAT vendor on behalf of Ahmed with the application in Desai’s name.200 
The business ultimately failed and the estate was sequestrated, with both Desai and SARS 
lodging claims against the insolvent estate.201 The Commissioner subsequently obtained a 
certified statement against Desai and also appointed his attorneys as his agents under section 
47 of the VAT Act.202  Desai argued that he was not the taxpayer in this instance.203  He further 
argued that section 47 could not be validly invoked as he was not the owner of the money in 
his attorneys’ possession.204 
The court noted the substantial similarity of section 47 of the VAT Act to section 99 of the 
Income Tax Act and in the court’s view, the purpose served by both provisions was the same.205  
As the case was being decided on the papers, and there was clearly a dispute as to whether 
Desai’s attorneys held the funds on his behalf, the court decided not to proceed with the matter 
and instead referred it for oral evidence.206  Notwithstanding the court’s decision, it seemed to 
agree with the notion that if a third party held funds not belonging to a taxpayer, the third party 
could not be appointed as agent of that taxpayer.207  
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As if to aggravate the impact of this power, the Tax Administration Act further provides that 
failure by an agent to heed to SARS’s instruction may result in the agent being held personally 
liable for the tax debt.208  In the interests of ameliorating the impact of this drastic power on 
taxpayers, it is suggested that taxpayers should be informed by those appointed as agents, as 
this may open the door for further negotiations between SARS and affected taxpayers.209  In 
addition, this may assist taxpayers to confirm whether the agents were in actual fact appointed 
by SARS.210 
4. DOES THE RULE CONSTITUTE A DEPRIVATION OR AN EXPROPRIATION OF   
TAXPAYERS’ MONEYS? 
According to the courts, the practice of taxation is neither a deprivation nor an expropriation 
of a taxpayer’s property. The Constitutional Court explained that although it is ‘practically 
impossible’ to coin a definition of property, a taxpayer’s money amounts to corporeal 
movable property and falls within the meaning of property as enshrined in section 25 of the 
Constitution.211 Money has also been described by the courts as ‘a species of property’.212  
Croome expresses the view that it is a deprivation but one that is sustainable under the 
limitation clause as it applies equally to the citizenry,213 and it is necessary for the effective 
functioning of the State.214  Therefore, it seems that the rule, being a mechanism by which 
effective taxation is achieved, does not constitute a deprivation or an expropriation of a 
taxpayer’s money. Thus, it is unlikely that an aggrieved taxpayer would succeed with such a 
claim.  
5. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the reason why the rule works so well is because of the enforcement 
mechanisms behind it.215  In view of the wide powers conferred upon SARS in the 
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enforcement provisions, it is not surprising that the dominant view amongst taxpayers and tax 
practitioners alike is that such powers are draconian in nature.216  It is suggested that a fair 
balance needs to be achieved between SARS’ mandate on the one hand, and the protection of 
taxpayers’ rights on the other.217
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATURE OF A TAX DEBT, AND THE ‘PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER’ RULE 
VERSUS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recovery of a tax debt is unlike that of an ordinary civil debt.1  SARS has been conferred 
with wide powers to facilitate the recovery of taxes.2 One such power is the mechanism by 
which SARS is able to obtain a certified statement, which is regarded as a civil judgment 
obtained against a defaulting taxpayer.3 The effect of these powers in light of taxpayers’ rights 
is discussed in this chapter. 
2. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF A TAX DEBT AS COMPARED TO AN ORDINARY CIVIL 
DEBT 
Where the liability of a debtor has been established by a court of law, the judgment creditor 
cannot, in terms of the settled common law principle, execute such a judgment if an appeal has 
been noted in respect thereof.4  This is so, unless the court in which judgment was given grants 
permission to the judgment creditor to act otherwise.5  The objective behind the principle is to 
protect a debtor from suffering irreversible damage before an appeal has been heard.6  This is 
because a judgment enables a creditor to take further drastic steps against a debtor, such as 
obtaining a writ or warrant of execution in order to attach such a debtor’s property.7 
However, as briefly stated above, the same is not true for a tax debt. The Tax Administration 
Act clearly provides that neither the noting of an objection nor an appeal suspends the pre-
existing obligation to pay tax.8  Thus, the rule is in conflict with the aforesaid common law 
principle. 
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This was confirmed in CIR v NCR Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd.9  The core question 
in this case pertained to when interest was payable on a refund by the revenue authority to a 
taxpayer and at what date it started to run,10 a discussion beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, the court made an important observation about the nature of a tax debt. It was held 
that the common law rule which calls for the automatic suspension of the execution of a 
judgment where a debtor disputes liability, does not operate in the case of a dispute pertaining 
to a tax debt.11  The court explained that as was stipulated in the Income Tax Act, the obligation 
to discharge a tax debt could only be suspended, not because of an objection by a taxpayer but 
rather where the Commissioner directed otherwise.12  Thus, a tax debt is a debt sui generis as 
the recovery thereof is not dependent upon litigation.13 Rather, it arises automatically by 
operation of law.14 
3. PRESCRIPTION OF A TAX DEBT AS COMPARED TO AN ORDINARY CIVIL DEBT 
An ordinary civil debt no longer stands after the lapse of its prescription period.15  This means 
that once an ordinary debt prescribes, a creditor is barred from claiming it.16  In terms of the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (hereinafter the ‘Prescription Act’), the prescription period for any 
debt except those specifically referred to in the statute with different prescription periods, is 
three years.17 However, a tax debt is clearly distinct from any other ordinary debt. The 
Prescription Act stipulates that a debt which involves the payment of tax only prescribes after 
thirty years.18 
The question of the prescription of a tax debt was demonstrated in Davis v Commissioner for 
South African Revenue Service.19  The taxpayer in casu, after having been compelled by his 
employer to change from a pension fund to a provident fund, later complained about what 
seemed to him to be excessive taxation of him in respect of both funds.20  His employer had 
                                                          
9 50 SATC 9. 
10 Supra note 9 para 10. 
11 Supra note 9 para 19. 
12 Supra note 9 para 20. 
13 SK Elliot The ‘Pay Now, Argue Later’ Principle in South African Tax Law: Its Development, Operation, 
Comparison to South African Civil Debt Enforcement and Consistency with the Constitutional Right of Access to 
Courts (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017) 48. 
14 Ibid. 
15 GB Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) 560. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Section 11(d) of the Prescription Act. 
18 Section 11(a)(iii) of the Prescription Act. 
19 2010 (5) SA 540 (KZD). 
20 Supra note 19 at 256. 
37 
 
undertaken to deal with the complaint.21 An amount from SARS was subsequently credited to 
the taxpayer’s account after he had retired.22 He assumed that it was a refund, seeing that no 
explanation had followed the payment.23 An explanation was to emerge later when SARS 
explained that the crediting of the taxpayer’s account had in fact been an administrative 
mistake, the actual recipient of the amount being the taxpayer’s employer.24 When SARS 
demanded a refund, the taxpayer argued that the amount claimed was an ordinary civil debt 
which was time-barred as a result of prescription.25 
The result of the proceedings was that the court found for the Commissioner. In arriving at its 
decision, the court explained that because of the mistake on the part of SARS, the taxpayer was 
paid a refund which was more than what he was actually entitled to.26  The court referred to 
the Income Tax Act which provided that an excessive refund was recoverable as though it were 
a tax.27  Thus, the court held that despite the administrative mistake, the amount was tax related 
and was to be recovered as a normal tax debt.28  The court found that the debt was a tax debt 
with a prescription period of thirty years as stipulated in the Prescription Act.29 
4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERMS DUE AND PAYABLE IN RESPECT OF A TAX 
DEBT 
Under the Income Tax Act, any tax or interest that was due or payable was regarded as a debt 
that was owed to the State.30  The VAT Act embodied a similar provision.31  Neither of the 
said statutes defined the terms due and payable. Consequently, the effect of the terms had to 
be determined by the courts in light of a taxpayer’s obligation to pay tax and SARS’ mandate 
to recover such tax or any other amount owed to it.  
In Traco Marketing (Pty) Ltd and another v Minister of Finance and others,32 the 
Commissioner had filed a certified statement against the vendors in terms of section 40(2)(a) 
of the VAT Act which had the effect of a civil judgment. Thereafter, the Commissioner had 
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proceeded to obtain a writ of execution with which he attached the vendors’ property.33  The 
vendors sought an order to set aside the statement and the writ of execution.34  Section 31(5) 
of the VAT Act required that a vendor be notified of an assessment and also to be informed of 
their entitlement to object thereto within 30 days.35  The vendors argued that it could not have 
been the legislator’s intention to permit the revenue authority to utilise the said mechanisms 
without ensuring that vendors were notified first.36 It was further argued that the vendors’ 
liability was yet to be finally determined, which could only occur once the Commissioner had 
dealt with the objections.37 
The court disagreed with the vendors and held that their argument was based on an incorrect 
interpretation of the VAT Act.38  The court explained that vendors were obliged to make VAT 
payments within the time frames enshrined in the VAT Act.39 According to the court, VAT 
became due and payable before the Commissioner had issued an assessment.40  An assessment 
was issued only where the Commissioner was not satisfied that a vendor had discharged their 
obligations under the VAT Act.41  The court also emphasised that the obligation to pay is not 
suspended by an objection either for 30 days or for any period in that regard.42 
Similarly in Singh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service,43 the gravamen of 
the taxpayer’s argument was that the Commissioner had failed to give him a notice of 
assessment before the certified statement was filed against him under section 40(2)(a) of the 
VAT Act. As a result, so the argument went, the statement procedure in the circumstances was 
invalid.44  The Commissioner advanced the argument that giving notice of assessment was 
risky as a taxpayer may as a result conceal his property in order to frustrate any resultant 
judgment.45  Although the VAT Act did not explicitly require that such notice be given to a 
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taxpayer before the filing of a statement, the court was tasked with establishing whether the 
granting of such notice was nonetheless implied by the statute.46 
In finding for the Commissioner, the court a quo echoed the ruling in Traco Marketing (Pty) Ltd 
and another v Minister of Finance and others47 and held that the VAT amount was already due and 
payable prior to the Commissioner issuing an assessment.48  This was because VAT is a self-
assessing system of tax which does not require the issuing of an assessment before an amount 
could be due and payable.49  Thus, the court held that the vendor did not have to be notified.50 
If he disagreed with the assessment, the usual remedies of objection and appeal were available 
to him.51  
The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, disagreed with the court a quo’s interpretation of the 
provision. According to the court, section 40 was merely a collection mechanism.52 It did not 
determine whether a VAT amount was due or payable.53 According to the court, therefore, 
unless an amount was payable, the statement procedure could not be validly invoked.54 Once 
an amount was payable, the Commissioner was empowered to recover it regardless of the 
lodging of an appeal or objection by the taxpayer.55 
The court explained that an amount was due if it was the correct amount that was supposed to 
be paid, either as shown in a taxpayer’s return or as established after the resolution of a 
dispute.56 On the other hand, an amount was payable if it was assessed but was still pending 
final determination where it had been contested.57  The court explained that in order for an 
amount to be payable, the existing obligation to pay had to be current and not contingent.58       
The court held that a notice of assessment was required in order for a taxpayer to know the 
amount that was payable.59  Since no notice was given to the taxpayer, the statement procedure 
could not be resorted to by the Commissioner.60  The court continued that although a vendor 
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may have submitted a return reflecting an amount which he believed to be due, an assessment 
would still be necessary to alert him of the fact that he may have to re-assess his liability.61 
This is because according to the court, a taxpayer would be unaware if not notified through an 
assessment.62   The court acknowledged the risk highlighted by the Commissioner but held that 
among other options, the Commissioner was still able to obtain judgment shortly after the 
issuing of an assessment.63   Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the court a quo’s 
ruling was incorrect.64 
Although concurring, Olivier JA in a separate judgment stated that it could not be easily 
inferred from section 40 whether notice was supposed to be given to a vendor before the 
statement procedure could be resorted to.65 He explained that if a debtor was required to 
immediately settle a debt, it was regarded as due.66  On the other hand, he explained that a debt 
was payable if it was speaking either to current liability or to contingent liability.67 In the 
context of section 40, the learned judge was of the view that the term due spoke of current 
liability whilst the term payable spoke of contingent liability.68  He held that whilst the amount 
in a vendor’s return is regarded as due, there might still be a contingent liability if the 
Commissioner issues an assessment reflecting the amount payable.69  He held that in order for 
the amount to have become due and payable or final and conclusive, an assessment had to be 
issued first and any objections or appeals thereto, had to be dealt with first.70 
The unequivocal ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeal is therefore clear that SARS cannot 
proceed with the recovery mechanisms prior to the issuing of an assessment to a taxpayer.71 
Although this case was decided in the context of VAT, the pertinent provisions of the VAT Act 
were substantially similar to those of the Income Tax Act, thereby making the judgment 
applicable to income tax as well.72 
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Nevertheless, there were different reasons for reaching the same conclusion. In such an 
instance, the reasoning of the majority is the precedent to be followed whilst that of the minority 
serves as persuasive authority.73  Therefore, in terms of the main judgment, SARS was at liberty 
to utilise the statement procedure despite a pending appeal or an objection.74  What SARS was 
precluded from doing was to proceed with the statement procedure without having first issued 
a notice of assessment.75 
At the time that Singh v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service76 was decided, the 
VAT Act and the Income Tax Act clearly stipulated that the noting of an appeal had no effect 
on the pre-existing obligation to pay tax.77  However, no reference was made to an objection; 
hence the uncertainty.78 A subsequent amendment to the Income Tax Act confirmed that both 
objections and appeals do not suspend the operation of the rule.79  Thus, the uncertainty was 
dispensed with. The current position under the Tax Administration Act places beyond doubt 
the position that neither an objection nor an appeal suspends the obligation to pay tax.80 
5. IS A CERTIFIED STATEMENT TANTAMOUNT TO A JUDGMENT? 
In terms of the former provisions in the Income Tax Act81 and the VAT Act,82 a certified 
statement obtained by the Commissioner had all the effects of a civil judgment. In terms of the 
current position under the Tax Administration Act, it is stipulated that a certified statement 
‘must be treated as a civil judgment lawfully given in the relevant court in favour of SARS for 
a liquid debt for the amount specified in the statement.’83  The courts have had occasion to 
determine whether a certified statement amounts to a judgment. 
 
In Mokoena v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service,84 section 91(1)(b) of the Income 
Tax Act was challenged on the grounds that it empowered the Commissioner to obtain 
judgment without prior notice to the taxpayer and without the issuing of summons. As a result 
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of what was referred to as ‘unexplained income’, the Commissioner had issued additional 
assessments for the tax years 2001 and 2002 to the taxpayer.85 The taxpayer had lodged an 
objection thereto.86  In spite of the objection, the Commissioner proceeded to file a certified 
statement against the taxpayer.87  When the Commissioner later discovered that his assessment 
was wrong, he allowed the taxpayer’s objection.88 
According to the court, the Commissioner could not obtain judgment where a taxpayer had 
lodged an objection.89  The court held that any objection or appeal had to be dealt with first 
before judgment could be obtained.90  The court explained that SARS’ power to collect tax 
regardless of a pending objection or appeal would be rendered nugatory if it was permitted to 
obtain judgment in the interim.91 As a result of the pending objection therefore, the court held 
that the judgment that was obtained was invalid.92  The court held that SARS would do well 
first to ensure that no objection has been lodged before proceeding to obtain judgment against 
a taxpayer.93  The court further explained that this would assist in protecting taxpayers’ rights 
before decisions with adverse consequences were taken against them.94 
It is clear that Spilg J regarded the statement as a judgment against the taxpayer.  
However, in Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another95 Binns-Ward J took the opposite view. The facts briefly were that 
Capstone had been reassessed by SARS and an assessment issued to it as a result of the 
proceeds that had been obtained from its sale of certain shares.96 Capstone simultaneously 
objected and lodged a suspension of payment request with SARS.97 When the objection was 
declined,98 capstone appealed to the Special Court.99 However, no reply had been given as 
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regards the suspension request.100  Pending the outcome of the appeal, Capstone was warned 
that if it did not make payment, SARS would not hesitate to not only obtain a certified statement 
but also a writ of execution against it.101 Capstone argued with reference to Mokoena v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service102 that SARS was not permitted to obtain judgment 
in the interim without first having dealt with the suspension request.103 
Binns-Ward J expressed the view that although the certified statement had the effect of a civil 
judgement, it was not in itself to be regarded as a judgment.104  He thus disagreed with Spilg J, 
and held that the latter’s ruling was based on an incorrect interpretation of section 91(1)(b) and 
the relevant judicial precedent.105  He explained that the certified statement was not in any way 
a sign of resolution of a dispute between a taxpayer and SARS.106 Rather, it was simply an 
enforcement mechanism by which SARS was enabled to collect tax that was payable.107  He 
continued that once tax became payable, a taxpayer was obliged to pay it although he or she 
disagreed with an assessment received.108 He referred to the various mechanisms that were 
provided for by the Income Tax Act, such as the statement procedure, to ensure that this was 
done effectively.109  The learned judge further explained that the reason why the statement had 
the effect of a civil judgment was so that the Commissioner could utilise it to obtain a writ of 
execution to attach a defaulting taxpayer’s property.110  He referred in this regard to Singh v 
Commissioner for South African Revenue Service111 in which the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the statement procedure did not aid the Commissioner in any way in determining 
whether a tax amount was due or payable; it was merely a collection mechanism.112  Thus, 
Binns-Ward J concluded that a certified statement is not tantamount to a judicially delivered 
judgment.113  The application was dismissed.114 
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Whilst uncertainty lingered as a result of the two conflicting High Court decisions, the High 
Court was yet again tasked with a similar determination in Modibane v South African Revenue 
Service.115 In casu, the taxpayer had lodged an objection and subsequently an appeal to 
assessments that had been issued to it by SARS.116  Whilst the objection was refused by SARS, 
the appeal to the Tax Court was yet to be decided at the time of the court proceedings.117  The 
taxpayer had not paid the tax amount to SARS throughout this period.118 As a result, SARS 
utilised the statement procedure.119  When SARS had declined to withdraw the judgment upon 
the taxpayer’s request, the latter instituted court proceedings to have the judgment set aside.120 
The taxpayer likewise argued that SARS could not proceed to obtain judgment in the face of a 
pending appeal.121 
Tsoka J expressed the same view as that of Binns-Ward J in Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd and Another 
v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another and held that the certified statement 
was not an actual judgment but simply had the effect of a judgment.122  It was not tantamount 
to a pronouncement made by the Commissioner, but was merely a tool through which taxpayers 
were compelled to honour their tax obligations.123  On that basis, therefore, the court concluded 
that it could not be rescinded in the same way that a judgment could.124  The court then went 
on to say that supposing that the statement were to be taken as an actual judicial judgment; the 
taxpayer had to show sound reasons as to why it had to be set aside.125 
Williams126 submits that the ruling in Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another127 was more persuasive than that in Mokoena v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service.128 However, he argues that although the ruling in the earlier 
judgment was incorrect, the learned judge manifestly attempted to show the unjust nature of 
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the rule towards taxpayers.129 Nonetheless, both judgments were High Court decisions that 
were heard by single judges.130  This means that they are on the same footing in terms of judicial 
precedent and the lower courts are bound by both of them.131 
It is further submitted that although in practice a certified statement is entered into the judgment 
book, it does not constitute a judgment by default.132 This is because neither are summons 
issued to taxpayers nor are the latter called upon to put up a defence against the issuing of a 
statement.133  The statement is merely a means of recovery of a tax debt.134 
In respect of the judgment in Modibane v South African Revenue Service,135 it is observed that 
despite Tsoka J’s reliance on Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and Another,136 the two judgments dealt with different issues.137 In the earlier 
judgment, the taxpayer sought to bar SARS from obtaining a certified statement whilst in the 
latter, the taxpayer sought a rescission of the certified statement that was obtained by SARS 
against the taxpayer.138 Thus, it seems that according to Tsoka J’s ruling, rescission of a 
certified statement is not one of the remedies at the disposal of taxpayers.139  This potentially 
places taxpayers in a vulnerable situation where SARS declines to withdraw a statement.140 It 
is further submitted that in view of the fact that a certified statement has the effect of a civil 
judgment, the rules that operate in respect of default judgments would also apply in respect of 
a certified statement.141 Consequently, the taxpayer would be able to apply for rescission or 
variation.142  In Kruger v CIR,143 the court held that the fact that the statement in that case was 
obtained in the taxpayer’s absence was a ground for rescission.  
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However, before a judgment can be set aside the person seeking such relief must show an 
‘operative illegality’ which renders such a judgment invalid.144 In other words, the applicant 
must clearly indicate the reasons why he or she objects to a judgment.145 An example of such 
an illegality in this context would be where SARS obtains a certified statement without having 
adhered to the obligatory preliminary step of issuing a notice of assessment to the taxpayer 
concerned.  
Although a certified statement is not a judgment according to the courts, the Tax 
Administration Act stipulates that it is to be regarded as a judgment. Thus, unlike other debtors 
whose property can only be attached by a judicial judgment handed down by a court of law, a 
mere statement suffices to enable SARS to obtain a writ or warrant of execution to attach a 
taxpayer’s property. For purposes of tax recovery, therefore, it seems to be of little significance 
that a certified statement is not a judgment, seeing that it is still able to accomplish what an 
actual judgment can. 
6. THE ‘PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER’ RULE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
Prior to the advent of the constitutional era in South Africa, it is submitted that SARS was in 
essence ‘a law unto itself’ and was authorised to act against taxpayers without recourse to the 
courts.146 However, in current democratic South Africa, in which the Constitution is the 
Grundnorm of the State, all law and conduct, including tax laws and the conduct of SARS 
officials is subject to the tenets of the Constitution.147  Since the inception of the Constitution, 
taxpayers gained the right to call into question the validity of tax legislation and the conduct of 
SARS officials.148  This approach has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court.149 
The Katz Commission was a commission of enquiry that was appointed to investigate specified 
aspects of the tax structure in South Africa.150 According to its report, the Katz Commission 
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found, amongst other findings, that the rule, coupled with the statement procedure was in 
conflict with the Constitutional right of access to the courts.151 
About the year 1996, the controversial nature of certain tax provisions caused concern on the 
part of SARS because it figured that taxpayers would decide not to pay their taxes on the basis 
of the unconstitutionality of tax provisions.152 Consequently, SARS applied directly to the 
Constitutional Court for a determination as to whether various provisions could stand 
constitutional muster, including the provisions containing the rule.153 However, such 
determination was not to be, as the Constitutional Court declined to adjudicate on the 
application on the basis that it did not call for direct access.154  That meant that SARS would 
have to deal with each individual attack as it came.155 
A constitutional attack was launched upon the rule in Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Service.156  The case concerned a dispute in respect of VAT. 
The sections of the VAT Act that were under attack were section 36(1) (which comprised the 
rule), section 40(2)(a) (the statement procedure) and section 40(5) (in terms of which a taxpayer 
was barred from disputing the correctness of an assessment).157  The core issue before the court 
was whether the impugned sections were at odds with a taxpayer’s right of access to the 
courts.158 
The taxpayer company, Metcash, was a liquor retailer as well as a wholesaler and distributor 
of goods.159  The dispute arose as a result of the Commissioner’s dissatisfaction with Metcash’s 
VAT returns and allegations of Metcash’s involvement in a number of counterfeit dealings, 
which had led SARS to issue assessments comprising additional tax, interest and penalties.160 
Metcash subsequently lodged an objection with SARS and also asked for extensions regarding 
the payment of the tax debt.161  When the Commissioner had refused the objection and also 
made known his intention to utilise the statement procedure if Metcash remained in default, 
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the latter applied to the court a quo for an urgent interdict to bar the former from proceeding 
with the statement mechanism.162 
In finding for Metcash, the court a quo based its decision on Lesapo v North West Agricultural 
Bank and Another,163 as the court considered the facts to be similar.164  According to the court 
a quo, a court’s intervention was excluded from the process.165  The court held that a vendor 
was obliged to settle an amount reflected in an assessment, despite the lodging of an objection 
or an appeal.166  The decision to direct otherwise lay not with a court of law but solely with the 
Commissioner.167  Thus in the court a quo’s view, it was clear that the impugned provisions 
infringed the right of access to the courts because a vendor was obliged to comply or face the 
dire consequences laid down in the Act, and the a court’s intervention was impermissible 
irrespective of the demands of justice.168  
The court a quo further explained that the importance of the right of access to the courts could 
not be overemphasised.169   This is because maintaining a society that is free of chaos, self-
help and anarchy requires the utmost protection of the right of access to the courts.170  In 
determining whether the provisions were sustainable under the limitation clause, the court held 
that they were not as there were other means that SARS court have utilised in order to meet its 
tax collection mandate such as stricter penalties, higher interest rates and demanding security 
for a tax debt.171  Thus, the court declared the provisions unconstitutional and referred its order 
to the Constitutional Court for confirmation.172 
The Constitutional Court held that nowhere in section 36(1) was recourse to the courts 
implicitly or impliedly prohibited.173  The court held that the section was not about access to 
the courts but rather referred to the fact that not even the appeal mechanism provided by the 
VAT Act could stay the operation of the rule, save where the Commissioner directed to the 
contrary.174  The court further held that although in terms of the said statute, the tribunal of first 
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instance as regards the merits of a dispute was the Special Court, section 36 did not in any way 
preclude an aggrieved vendor from approaching the ordinary courts for any other relief within 
the parameters of that court’s jurisdiction.175  Thus, the Constitutional Court disagreed with the 
court a quo’s ruling.176 
The Constitutional Court continued that although the Special Court was not an ordinary court 
of law, it still functioned like an ordinary court in all its processes.177  It was given wide powers 
to adjudicate upon tax disputes and to ensure that the Commissioner’s decisions and conduct 
were legally compliant.178  According to the court, this in itself was a strong indication that the 
legislature intended tax disputes to be resolved fairly, independently and impartially as would 
be the case in the ordinary courts.179 
The court rejected Snyders J’s ruling in the court a quo that the statement procedure allowed 
the Commissioner to resort to self-help.180  Kriegler J distinguished the facts of this case from 
those of Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another181 and explained that in the earlier 
case, the impugned statute clearly empowered a bank to attach and sell its debtors’ properties 
devoid of the courts’ involvement.182  The court held that in this case the statement procedure 
could only be utilised through the courts, by court officials and in compliance with court 
procedures.183 An aggrieved vendor was only barred from disputing the correctness of the 
statement.184 According to the court, the section did not forbid a vendor from challenging the 
statement on any other ground save the correctness thereof.185 This is because disputes 
pertaining to the correctness of assessments and the merits were to be determined in the 
prescribed forum namely, the Special Court.186 
The court further held that section 40(5) was simply a temporary mechanism that was aimed at 
compelling a vendor to settle the VAT amount despite contesting it.187  Such a vendor was still 
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entitled to pursue the usual remedies, which included recourse to the ordinary courts.188 
Moreover, where the Commissioner was wrong, such a vendor would be entitled to a refund 
plus interest as was stipulated in the VAT Act.189 
Interestingly, however, the court agreed with Metcash’s contention that the effect of the rule 
was such that a taxpayer was precluded from approaching a court to obtain an interdict to stay 
the rule’s operation.190  To that extent, it was accepted by Kriegler J that the rule limited the 
right of access to the courts.191  Nonetheless, he found the limitation to be sustainable in terms 
of section 36 of the Constitution.192 In reaching this conclusion, he explained that the rule is 
only as effective as the implementation mechanisms behind it.193 He held further that the 
provisions were justified because the public interest demands that taxes are collected speedily 
and effectively.194 The learned judge continued that requiring the prompt payment of taxes is 
an important tool in curbing vexatious and frivolous objections that would otherwise arise.195  
In addition, it was held that the rule is not unique to South Africa.196  It is a mechanism that is 
recognised and implemented in several democracies around the world.197 The court also 
referred to the fact that the rule was not set in stone as the said statute conferred a discretion 
upon the Commissioner to suspend its operation in certain circumstances.198  The court left 
open the question as to whether the same reasoning would be applicable if a similar attack were 
to arise in the context of income tax.199 
In one breath the court seemed to say that the rule did not infringe the right of access to the 
courts whilst in another, it seemed to acknowledge a limitation of the right albeit one that was 
justifiable under the limitation clause.200 It is common cause that taxpayers’ constitutional 
rights are not set in stone.201  They are capable of limitation pursuant to the prescripts of the 
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limitation clause.202  Notwithstanding this fact, the courts are generally not keen to interfere 
with the wide powers that have been conferred upon SARS.203 
Binns-Ward J in Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another drew a distinction between liability for VAT being a system of self–regulation, as 
opposed to liability for income tax which is solely determined by SARS.204  According to the 
learned judge, the Constitutional Court’s reasoning which influenced its decision might not be 
applicable in a similar challenge in an income tax dispute.205 
In response to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, Olivier206 argues that at no point did the 
taxpayer contend that the ordinary courts had no jurisdiction at all. Rather, at the time of the 
operation of the rule, a vendor was precluded from approaching the courts to oust its 
operation.207  She further argues that the court omitted to consider the possibility that as a result 
of the operation of the rule, a vendor might not be in a financially viable position to pursue 
alternative remedies afterwards.208  She also expresses the view that neither the court a quo nor 
the Constitutional Court shed some light as regards the actual comparable provisions of other 
jurisdictions made mention of, which justify the rule’s adoption in South Africa.209  Olivier 
also highlights the fact that the Constitutional Court did not consider the issue of less invasive 
means such as those that were suggested by Snyders J in the court a quo.210 She further 
expresses the view that it would have been better if the Constitutional Court had clearly 
acknowledged a limitation of the right and then proceeded to show why such limitation was 
justifiable under the limitation clause.211 The persuasive effect of Olivier’s views in this regard 
cannot be ignored. 
It is evident that launching constitutional attacks on tax provisions is not only lengthy and 
costly, but victory is also not guaranteed.212  It is submitted that taxpayers stand a better chance 
at success if they raise administrative rather than constitutional attacks on tax legislation.213 
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7. CONCLUSION 
As is apparent from the above discussion, a measure of uncertainty regarding whether a 
certified statement is an actual judgment, remains due to the conflicting case law. What is clear 
however, is that the statement mechanism is a powerful tool in the hands of SARS, as it has the 
effects of a civil judgment. A ray of hope for taxpayers is the assurance that they are entitled 
to a notice of assessment214 as well as ten business days’ notice before a statement can be filed 
against them.215  The courts have acknowledged the extensive powers conferred upon SARS 
and have held that these powers must not be misused but must be exercised in compliance with 
the law and the Constitution.216 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE AVAILABLE TAXPAYER REMEDIES AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY 
ARE ADEQUATE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 ‘As a citizen you have an obligation to the country’s tax system, but you also have an obligation to 
yourself to know your rights under the law.’1  
Taxpayers must be aware of their rights if the protection of those rights is to be achieved.2  As 
explained in chapter one, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the remedies available to 
taxpayers when dealing with SARS and to determine whether they provide effective protection 
to taxpayers.  
2. REMEDIES UNDER THE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT 
 An obligation is placed upon SARS to refund any amounts plus interest that were erroneously 
recovered by it.3  Despite this provision, this does not eliminate the possible financial hardship 
that a taxpayer might have to endure before such a refund occurs and whilst the taxpayer 
concerned attempts to obtain some recourse from the available remedies.4 
(a) Reasons, objections and appeals 
In the past, there was no obligation on the Commissioner to furnish reasons for an amount in 
an assessment.5  Under the Tax Administration Act, taxpayers who disagree with an assessment 
are entitled to ask for reasons as to how the assessment was arrived at.6  The reasons must be 
adequate and in writing.7 If a taxpayer is still unhappy despite having received reasons, they 
have a right to object to the assessment.8 Discretion is conferred upon the Commissioner to 
either allow or refuse an objection.9 If an objection is allowed, SARS must amend the 
assessment.10 The Commissioner may either fully or partly refuse an objection.11 Where an 
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objection is refused, a taxpayer is further entitled to appeal the Commissioner’s decision either 
to the Tax Board or to the Tax Court.12  
The Tax Administration Act specifies timeframes within which objections and appeals must 
be lodged by taxpayers. Since the process for appeals13 is similar to that of objections, this 
discussion is confined to objections. The time frame within which an aggrieved taxpayer must 
lodge an objection is 30 days, after which an assessment becomes decisive.14  An extension 
may be permitted by a senior SARS official if the taxpayer concerned furnishes reasonable 
grounds.15 However, the statute does not provide further guidance as to what constitutes 
reasonable grounds. Interpretation note 15 of SARS attempts to provide guidance in this regard 
by providing that when establishing whether reasonable grounds are present, a senior SARS 
official is obliged to take into account relevant factors which include ‘the reasons for the delay, 
the length of the delay, the prospects of success on the merits, and any other relevant factor’.16   
The period of extension is limited to 21 business days save where exceptional circumstances 
warrant an extension beyond that threshold.17  However, no extension in excess of three years 
is permitted.18 The Tax Administration Act likewise provides no guidance as to what 
constitutes exceptional circumstances. Since no definition is provided, it is submitted that the 
term must be understood in its ordinary grammatical sense.19 In determining whether 
exceptional circumstances exist, each case would have to be decided on its own merits.20 The 
term may be interpreted as ‘something out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature’.21  
As already discussed, although the remedies of objection and appeal are available to an 
aggrieved taxpayer, they do not oust the operation of the rule. A taxpayer is still required by 
law to pay the amounts demanded by SARS on pain of the consequences discussed in the prior 
chapters. 
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(b) Request for suspension of payment 
This is the only remedy that creates a possibility for the suspension of the rule. A taxpayer who 
has either contested or who intends to contest an assessment or a decision by SARS has a right 
to apply for the suspension of payment of an amount of tax.22  SARS is barred, within ten 
business days of receipt of a suspension request, from utilising the recovery mechanisms in the 
Tax Administration Act.23  This is so, except where SARS harbours a reasonable belief of a 
possible dissipation of the taxpayer’s property.24 SARS is likewise barred from proceeding 
with collection procedures, ten business days after the suspension request has been refused or 
revoked.25  It is in these instances that the mighty ‘pay now, argue later’ rule may be 
momentarily suspended. 
However, the power conferred upon SARS in considering a suspension request is discretionary, 
as evidenced by the use of the word may.26  Thus, the mere lodging of a suspension request is 
no reason for a taxpayer to become comfortable or passive.27  Rather, a taxpayer must ensure 
continued communication and co-operation with SARS.28 When dealing with a suspension 
request, a senior SARS official is required to take into account certain considerations under 
section 164(3). The Income Tax Act formerly contained a similar provision in section 88 which 
provided for the suspension of payment upon consideration of specified and other relevant 
factors.29  The only difference is that the discretion that previously vested in the Commissioner 
is now delegated to a senior SARS official.30 
In its initial form, section 164(3) comprised the following considerations which a senior SARS 
official was obliged to take into account in reaching a decision: 
(a) the compliance history of the taxpayer; 
(b) the amount of tax involved; 
(c) the risk of dissipation of assets by the taxpayer concerned during the period of suspension; 
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(d) whether the taxpayer is able to provide adequate security for the payment of the amount 
involved; 
(e) whether payment of the amount involved would result in irreparable financial hardship to 
the taxpayer; 
(f) whether sequestration or liquidation proceedings are imminent; 
(g) whether fraud is involved in the origin of the dispute; or 
(h) whether the taxpayer has failed to furnish information requested under this Act for purposes 
of a decision under this section.31 
Practitioners and academics alike have expressed doubt in relation to the factors. Williams32 
submits that no clarity is given as regards the weight that is to be accorded to each of the factors. 
He further expresses the view that the relevance of the factor pertaining to the amount of tax 
involved is doubtful in that it raises the question as to what bearing the amount involved has 
on the decision whether or not to agree to the suspension of payment.33  Kruger suggests that 
the financial statements of the taxpayer would be helpful in assisting to establish whether a 
taxpayer would have sufficient funds to settle the payment if the suspension is granted.34 
In respect of a taxpayer’s compliance history, Van Zyl and Van Wyk observe that it is uncertain 
as to whether this is examined generally in relation to all taxes that the concerned taxpayer is 
obliged to pay or only to a tax in respect of a dispute.35  They further observe that it is unclear 
as from what date the compliance history is to be determined.36  Kotze suggests ‘regular or 
serious transgressions in the past, applications for voluntary disclosure relief or amnesty in the 
past, or any unsuccessful disputes by the taxpayer in the past’ as pertinent factors to the 
determination of a taxpayer’s compliance history.37  Kruger submits that SARS may consider, 
inter alia, how co-operative the taxpayer is in the payment of taxes, the rendering of returns 
and  how co-operative the taxpayer is in allowing SARS to carry out its investigations on the 
former.38 
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No definition is provided for the term ‘dissipation of assets’. Kruger suggests that the term be 
interpreted in the tax context to refer to the squandering or concealment of assets which is 
aimed at frustrating the purpose of SARS to recover the outstanding debt.39  However, he 
makes it clear that this interpretation is not applicable to the sale of assets in good faith and at 
market related prices.40  Kotze defines dissipation as a depletion of a taxpayer’s assets which 
has the effect of prejudicing SARS’s collection of tax at a future date.41 
In respect of the tendering of adequate security to SARS, it is not clear when the security 
tendered will be considered adequate. Kruger suggests that such security may be a pledge on 
the taxpayer’s assets, or an amount of money that is equal to or which is more than the amount 
of tax demanded by SARS.42  He submits that such security would ensure that SARS does not 
suffer prejudice whilst the dispute is being resolved.43 It is arguable this school of thought is 
problematic on the basis that it is unjust to demand security for a debt that is contested by a 
taxpayer. When a tax debt is contested, the interests of both the taxpayer and SARS are at stake. 
Whilst SARS would still have the wide powers of recovery under the Tax Administration Act 
at its disposal, compelling a taxpayer to tender security for a tax debt that is contested may 
result in serious hardship of a financial or other nature for the taxpayer. Generally, debtors 
tender security for debts in terms of which they clearly acknowledge their indebtedness. 
The term ‘irreparable financial hardship’ was likewise not defined. Williams expresses the 
view that the term is unsuitable on the basis that a taxpayer who incurs financial loss may be 
compensated through an award of damages.44  It seems that each case would have to be decided 
on its own facts.45  Kruger submits that the hardship will be irreparable if the taxpayer cannot 
be placed in the position that they were in before the hardship occurred.46 It appears that if 
according to SARS, the taxpayer concerned will not suffer irreparable financial hardship, 
SARS may decline the suspension request and persist in its demand for payment.47  However, 
if the taxpayer clearly shows that they will endure irreparable financial difficulty, SARS may 
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nonetheless insist on payment on the grounds that the taxpayer might not have funds later if 
the obligation to pay is suspended.48 
The difficulty in respect of the factor pertaining to fraud is that no explanation is given as to 
what is meant by ‘the origin of the dispute’.49  In addition, Rood refers to the lack of clarity 
regarding whether this factor merely requires an allegation of fraud or a conviction.50  He 
argues that if it is the former, it prejudices the taxpayer as he or she would not be given a chance 
to put up a defence.51  Van Zyl and Van Wyk submit that since the Tax Administration Act 
does not clarify the weight that is to be attached to each factor, it is possible for SARS to attach 
greater weight to this factor.52  This is especially so in light of the fact that fraud is not only a 
crime under the criminal law, but also a tax offence under the said statute.53  The existence of 
fraud is a question of fact.54  
The legislature subsequently enacted the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 44 of 2014 
(hereinafter, ‘the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act’). Section 50 of the Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Act amended the initial section 164(3) of the Tax 
Administration Act. In terms of the current section 164(3), the relevant factors that a senior 
SARS official may take into account when considering a suspension request include the 
following: 
(a) whether the recovery of the disputed tax will be in jeopardy or there will be a risk of  
       dissipation of assets; 
(b) the compliance history of the taxpayer with SARS; 
(c) whether fraud is prima facie involved in the origin of the dispute; 
(d) whether payment will result in irreparable hardship to the taxpayer not justified by the 
prejudice to SARS or the fiscus if the disputed tax is not paid or recovered; or 
(e) whether the taxpayer has tendered adequate security for the payment of the disputed tax 
and accepting it is in the interest of SARS or the fiscus;55 
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It is apparent from the amended section that the outline of the relevant factors is shorter.56  A 
number of advantages and disadvantages for the taxpayer in relation to the amended section 
have been identified.57  The word including suggests that the list is not a closed one.58  Thus, 
the relevant factors that SARS may consider are not confined to those specified in the list.59 
This alteration seems to be advantageous to taxpayers, seeing that it is open to SARS to 
consider other relevant factors.60  The amended section adds a further factor which speaks of 
the collection of tax being in jeopardy if a suspension request is granted.61 As discussed in 
chapter two, section 94 of the Tax Administration Act similarly empowers SARS to recover 
tax before a return is due if recovery at later stage would be in jeopardy. However, the statute 
provides no guidance as to when recovery will be regarded as being in jeopardy.62 
As opposed to the initial section which called for a consideration into whether a taxpayer was 
in a position to provide adequate security, the amended section requires such security to be 
provided prior to the consideration of a suspension request, thereby making the factor more 
burdensome for taxpayers.63  As argued above, it is unjust to place a burden of this nature on a 
contested tax debt. 
Whilst the initial section referred to the term ‘irreparable financial hardship’, the amended 
section speaks of ‘irreparable hardship’.64 Although the latter term is likewise not defined, it 
widens the scope of hardship considered, which is no longer confined to financial hardship.65 
Thus, this alteration likewise appears to be advantageous to taxpayers.66 
SARS is also empowered to refuse to grant a request for suspension if it is satisfied that such a 
request is ‘frivolous or vexatious’67 or if the taxpayer is simply resorting to ‘dilatory tactics’ in 
order to frustrate the recovery of tax by SARS.68 If SARS declines to grant a suspension 
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request, the objection and appeal remedies are not available to the taxpayer.69  It follows that 
the taxpayer would once again be compelled to pay the amount demanded by SARS.70  This 
remains the case even where such a taxpayer decides to resort to judicial review.71  
Although this is the remedy through which the rule may be suspended, it is dependent upon the 
consideration of factors which are not clearly defined in the statute. It is likely that the courts 
will experience difficulty in attempting to interpret the factors, should a matter be referred for 
judicial review.72  
The leading case currently on statutory interpretation is Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v 
Endumeni Municipality.73  It was held that the interpretation process is an objective one.74  The 
interpreter is required at the very beginning to have regard to the ordinary grammatical meaning 
of the words in a provision, the context75 as well as the purpose,76 all of which are equally 
important.77 If a number of meanings can be inferred from a provision, due regard must be had 
to the same factors (ordinary grammatical meaning, context and purpose) in respect of each 
meaning.78  The court rejected the conventional notion of ascertaining the legislature’s 
intention and emphasised that in the process of interpretation, the focus is solely the language 
contained in the provision.79  The court explained that this is because the interpreter interprets 
a provision in entirely different circumstances without knowing exactly what the thoughts of 
the legislature were at the time of drafting.80  These principles would assist a court in attempting 
to interpret the factors in section 164(3). 
Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that legislative provisions which are difficult to understand 
or which are ambiguous, do not create certainty.81 Instead they open the door for numerous 
disputes between SARS and taxpayers.82  It is important that meanings be accorded to the 
                                                          
69 SAICA ‘Pay now, argue later’ November 2014 – Issue 182, available at https://www.saica.co.za, accessed on 
01 May 2018. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 RC Williams ‘Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill (B14 of 2014) will effect amendments to the Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011’ available at https://www.pwc.co.za, accessed on 08 November 2018. 
73 [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA). 
74 Supra note 73 para 18. 
75 Supra note 73 para 19. 
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77 Supra note 73 para 19. 
78 Supra note 73 para 18. 
79 Supra note 73 para 20. 
80 Supra note 73 para 21. 
81 RC Williams Income Tax in South Africa: Law & Practice 2 ed (1995) 3. 
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factors and terms in section 164 within the tax context as this would create certainty for 
taxpayers who intend to apply for the suspension of the payment of disputed amounts of tax. It 
is also worth noting that although taxpayers are afforded an opportunity to request for a 
suspension of payment, no time frame is provided within which SARS must render a reply to 
the request.83 
3. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES 
(a) Judicial review, constitutional and delictual remedies 
The courts have confirmed that the discretionary powers conferred upon SARS amount to 
administrative action, which is reviewable.84  Such review would take place in terms of 
PAJA.85 Thus, an aggrieved taxpayer is entitled to apply for the review of the decisions or 
conduct of SARS and its officials. However, success in a review application does not guarantee 
an award of damages as these are granted only in exceptional circumstances.86  
A court may grant constitutional damages to an aggrieved taxpayer where it is appropriate to 
grant such relief.87 If a court sets aside an administrative action and such an order does not 
properly recompense the applicant, this would prompt an award for constitutional damages.88 
However, as previously mentioned, Constitutional Court litigation is not affordable to many 
taxpayers and success is not certain.89  
In some instances, the actions or inaction of SARS may cause a taxpayer to suffer economic 
loss.90 Since the SARS Act does not exempt SARS from delictual liability, it is open to a 
taxpayer to claim delictual damages for pure economic loss from SARS.91  However, a taxpayer 
would have to prove that SARS had a duty of care, which was breached, thereby resulting in 
the wrongfulness of SARS’s conduct.92  It is submitted that wrongfulness would not be an easy 
element to prove.93 Croome argues that SARS, as an organ of state has a constitutional 
                                                          
83 A Lewis ‘Pay now, argue later: are there any exceptions to this rule? : tax administration act’ 2016 TAXtalk 
55. 
84 Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v CSARS And Others 1999 (3) SA 1133 (W) at 1144-5. 
85 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) paras 
22 and 25. 
86 See section 8 of PAJA. 
87 B Croome & L Olivier Tax Administration 2 ed (2015) 633. 
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obligation of accountability to its citizens.94 He argues that it may be a ground for claiming 
delictual damages that SARS, through its conduct, caused undue damage to a taxpayer.95 
4. ONUS OF PROOF 
The Income Tax Act formerly placed the onus of proof in tax disputes on SARS.96 This 
provision was repealed because it was regarded as unduly cumbersome on SARS as the 
information that was required to discharge the onus was within the taxpayer’s knowledge.97 
The current position under the Tax Administration Act places the onus of proof on a taxpayer 
that SARS’s decision, which is objectionable or appealable, was erroneous.98 The standard of 
proof is on a balance of probabilities.99 
5. JURISDICTION IN TAX DISPUTES 
It is not only important for taxpayers to be aware of the remedies at their disposal. It is also 
crucial that taxpayers are aware of the appropriate forums to approach for their grievances 
against SARS.  As already stated, for instance, a taxpayer who wishes to request for reasons 
for an assessment or who wishes to lodge an objection must do so at SARS. However, the Tax 
Administration Act provides for other forums at which tax grievances or disputes are to be 
resolved. 
(a) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
If an objection is refused, a taxpayer may either take the route of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) or appeal to the Tax Board or to the Tax Court.100  ADR is a more affordable and faster 
alternative for taxpayers.101 It is not tantamount to litigation but is rather a distinct process 
through which the resolution of tax disputes may be achieved.102  There is a code of conduct 
which the facilitator of the ADR process is obliged to obey to ensure a just outcome.103 An 
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96 Section 82 of the Income Tax Act. 
97 Croome & Olivier op cit note 87 at 262. 
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agreement reached through ADR must be given effect to by SARS issuing a revised or amended 
assessment to the taxpayer.104 
(b) Tax Board 
The Tax Administration Act provides for the establishment of a Tax Board by the Minister of 
Finance.105  The Tax Board is not a court of law but is rather an administrative tribunal.106 
Taxpayers that are in dispute with SARS regarding an assessment or a decision by SARS are 
required to first attempt to resolve the dispute through the Tax Board, provided that both parties 
consent to referring the matter thereto and provided that the amount in question is not more 
than that which is determined by the Minister of Finance by public notice.107  The panel of the 
Tax Board is appointed by the Minister of Finance and comprises a chairperson, an accountant 
and a person who appears on behalf of the business community.108 
(c) Tax Court  
The Tax Court is not an appeal court in the generic sense of the word109 but is simply a creature 
of the statute,110 and its decisions do not create binding precedents.111  It comprises a president 
of the Tax Court, an accountant and a person who appears on behalf of the business 
community.112  The proceedings of the Tax Court are held in-camera.113  This is intended for 
purposes of maintaining confidentiality of a taxpayer’s affairs.114  A taxpayer may elect to 
either represent himself or herself, or to have a representative.115  The Tax Court lacks both the 
authority to determine the constitutionality of tax provisions as well as to make determinations 
involving PAJA.116  Its jurisdiction is limited to appeals under the Tax Administration Act.117 
The Tax Court may either establish the correctness of an assessment or decision, order that an 
assessment or decision be changed or refer an assessment back to SARS for further 
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consideration.118  A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the ruling of the Tax Court is entitled to 
appeal further to a full bench of the High Court or to the SCA.119  
6. JUDICIAL ATTITUDE REGARDING TAXPAYERS’ REMEDIES AND JURISDICTION 
IN TAX DISPUTES 
In light of the available tribunals that may be approached in an attempt to resolve tax disputes, 
taxpayers might be forgiven for thinking that they are at liberty to approach any one at will. 
However, as demonstrated by the discussion of the case law hereunder, this is not necessarily 
the case. The courts have held that the manner in which an assessment or a decision by the 
revenue authority is to be challenged is that which is laid down in the tax statutes namely, 
objection and appeal.120 
In Rossi and Others v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service121 SARS had 
demanded an amount of tax from the taxpayer by way of a letter. SARS subsequently recovered 
the amounts through the appointment of the taxpayer’s bank as agent.122  The taxpayer sought 
a refund on the basis that the letter and other accompanying documents that were issued did 
not amount to valid assessments under the Income Tax Act.123  SARS conceded that although 
the letter did not constitute the actual assessment,124 it was nonetheless compelling proof of the 
amounts that were owed to it by the taxpayer.125  It was further argued by SARS that the 
timeframe within which the taxpayer could challenge the validity of the assessment had 
lapsed.126 
The court declined to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute and confined its determination to 
the jurisdiction issue.127 The court pointed out that the first step a taxpayer that is aggrieved by 
an assessment must take is to lodge an objection.128  Where an objection is refused, such a 
taxpayer is further entitled to appeal the disallowance.129  In casu the time frame within which 
                                                          
118 Section 129(1) of the Tax Administration Act. 
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the taxpayer could lodge an objection had lapsed130 and he had not appealed the matter.131  The 
court held that by approaching the High Court, the taxpayer was merely attempting to 
circumvent the consequences of not having timeously utilised the remedies of objection and 
appeal as was provided for in the Income Tax Act.132  Thus, the court made it clear that 
taxpayers are not at liberty to elect whether to take their dispute to the Tax Court or to the High 
Court.133  The court referred to such conduct as ‘forum shopping’ on the taxpayer’s part, which 
the court declared unacceptable.134 According to the Court, this could never have been the 
legislature’s intention.135 Rather, the Tax Court was put in place specifically to resolve tax 
disputes.136 Thus, the court dismissed the matter on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear it.137 
In MTN International (Mauritius) Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service138 
the Commissioner had issued an additional assessment to the taxpayer. The taxpayer launched 
an application in terms of PAJA to review and set aside the additional assessment.139  The 
grounds of the application were that SARS had back dated the assessment in an attempt to 
circumvent prescription as provided for in the Income Tax Act.140 It was further argued that 
the Commissioner had taken into account irrelevant considerations and that SARS had not 
properly applied its mind but had acted under ulterior motives.141  
The issues before the court were whether SARS had failed to adhere to the requisite procedures 
in raising the additional assessment and whether as a result, the assessment was void for 
infringing upon the taxpayer’s right to fair and just administrative action.142  The court held 
that the allegations that were brought against SARS involved the merits of the matter and would 
have required the court to make a determination on the merits.143  The court explained that in 
order to determine whether the Commissioner had acted with ulterior motives or in bad faith, 
it had to first establish whether the Commissioner had deemed that it was appropriate to issue 
                                                          
130 Supra note 121 para 12. 
131 Supra note 121 para 13. 
132 Supra note 121 para 18. 
133 Supra note 121 para 32. 
134 Supra note 121 para 32. 
135 Supra note 121 para 32. 
136 Supra note 121 para 32. 
137 Supra note 121 para 41. 
138 75 SATC 171 para 1. 
139 Supra note 138 para 1. 
140 Supra note 138 para 8. 
141 Supra note 138 para 24. 
142 Supra note 138 para 19. 
143 Supra note 138 para 25. 
66 
 
the additional assessment in the circumstances.144  The court held that such a determination lay 
solely with the Tax Court145 and the application was dismissed with costs.146 
In Medox Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service147 the taxpayer company 
applied to the High Court to have all the income tax assessments that had been issued to it set 
aside. SARS contended that the dispute pertained to the merits of the case and as a result the 
High Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon.148 In addition, SARS argued that the 
taxpayer had omitted to utilise the remedies of objection and appeal and that its claim had 
prescribed.149  The taxpayer conceded the tardiness of its claim but attempted to overcome this 
impediment by arguing that since its claim had prescribed, it had no other remedy save to 
approach the High Court for relief.150 
The court held that in respect of tax disputes, the High Court is not a court of first instance.151 
The court also pointed out with reference to PAJA that there is a bar to resorting to the judicial 
review remedy until other internal remedies have been utilised.152  The court found that the 
taxpayer had not timeously utilised the internal remedies of objection and appeal, and held that 
its conduct was nothing more than an attempt to bypass the clear provisions of the Income Tax 
Act.153 The court similarly declined to adjudicate on the matter on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction.154  The court explained that the nature of the dispute was such that it required the 
court to delve into the merits, which only the Tax Court had jurisdiction to determine.155 
The Constitutional Court in Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service156 held that where taxpayers seek relief from the High Court, its jurisdiction 
as regards tax disputes is limited to legal issues.  In addition, the High Court can only grant 
interlocutory and not final relief in this regard.157 
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It is clear from the above discussion the importance of taxpayers to be aware of the appropriate 
forums to approach. Taxpayers are required to make use of the remedies in the Tax 
Administration Act as a matter of first resort and to approach the Tax Board or the Tax Court, 
which will deal with the merits of a dispute. Although taxpayers also have the remedy of 
judicial review, they are required to first make use of internal remedies as provided for in the 
Tax Administration Act. Thus, a taxpayer who intends to challenge SARS either by way of an 
appeal or a review, must be mindful of the crucial distinction between the two. 
 Galgult J in Income Tax Case Number 1697 explained the trite legal principles thus: 
An appeal is a process whereby the court is entitled to consider the correctness of the conclusion 
reached and to interfere, if that conclusion is wrong, by substituting its own decision…if 
legislation accords it such right. On the other hand, a court’s power of review, which really 
means nothing more than judicial scrutiny…arises from a court’s general or inherent power to 
prevent illegalities… . The court’s only function on review…is to enquire into whether there 
has been an illegality in the procedure. If there has been such an illegality, the court will set 
aside the decision, and will refer it back for reconsideration by the official concerned. Examples 
of such illegalities are where the decision is reached mala fide, or where the official has acted 
capriciously or arbitrarily in arriving at it, or where he has failed to follow the procedure laid 
down in the enabling legislation.158 
7. ALTERNATIVES TO APPROACHING THE COURTS  
There are other alternatives that taxpayers may opt for instead of approaching the courts. An 
example is the SARS Complaints Management Office (CMO) to which taxpayers may refer 
their complaints.159  The said office only deals with disputes involving SARS’s failure to 
adhere to administrative procedures.160  It has no authority to deal with the merits of a dispute 
as well as matters that have already been referred to the courts or to the Public Protector, or 
matters involving SARS policy.161 
Taxpayers may approach the office of the Tax Ombud (OTO) which was established by the 
Minister of Finance under the Tax Administration Act.162  The OTO was not in place in the 
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past in the South African Jurisdiction163 and is thus a refreshing change. The OTO deals with 
complaints involving service and the procedures that SARS is obliged to follow in terms of any 
tax statute.164  Fortunately, the independence of the OTO is established by virtue of the fact 
that it is answerable, not to SARS, but to the Minister of Finance.165 Initially, officials of the 
OTO were appointed under the SARS Act, in terms of which the Commissioner had a say.166 
A similar provision was contained in the Tax Administration Act.167 This caused dissatisfaction 
amongst tax commentators on the basis that such officials would most probably have practiced 
partiality towards SARS’s cause over the plight of taxpayers.168 
In view of this, the Tax Ombud, Judge Ngoepe, recommended amendments to the relevant 
provisions in order to achieve the independence of the OTO.169 The relevant provision was 
subsequently amended to the effect that the portion which required consultation with the 
Commissioner in the appointment of officials of the OTO was eliminated.170 However, the 
OTO similarly has neither the authority to determine the merits of a complaint nor to review 
tax policy, tax statutes and matters that have been to the Tax Court.171 Moreover, the OTO 
merely serves the role of an independent conciliator or mediator.172  Its recommendations have 
no binding effect but are simply aimed at attempting to resolve disputes.173 
Alternatively, taxpayers are at liberty to approach the Public Protector, an institution that is 
empowered to make enquiries into alleged misuse of power by the state and its organs;174 or 
the South African Human Rights Commission.175  However, these institutions lack employees 
with the necessary tax skills to adequately handle tax related complaints.176 
 The benefits of the various forums through which taxpayers may attempt to resolve their 
disputes with SARS are acknowledged. For instance, this assists taxpayers to choose which 
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forums to approach in accordance with their means. Indeed, the informal nature and the cost-
effectiveness of these forums make them an attractive alternative to litigation in the courts.177  
However, it is arguable that these forums simply provide taxpayers with various options. They 
do not in themselves have sufficient ameliorating effect on the wide powers conferred upon 
SARS. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The statutory remedies of objection, appeal and the request for suspension of payment, as 
well as the statutory forums in place to assist in the resolving of tax disputes are 
acknowledged. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the remedies in their current form do little 
to assist taxpayers who are still compelled to settle amounts demanded by SARS on pain of 
the consequences stipulated in the Tax Administration Act. SARS is in a highly privileged 
position as opposed to the taxpayer.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
1. OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS 
The purpose of this mini dissertation was to critically discuss the ‘pay now, argue later’ rule in 
South African tax law. The result of the operation of the rule is that once SARS issues a tax 
assessment to a taxpayer, the amount reflected therein must be paid by the taxpayer to SARS 
despite the taxpayer disputing such amount. As discussed in chapter two, the rule does not 
stand alone. Its strength lies in the mechanisms provided in the Tax Administration Act, in 
terms of which certain powers are bestowed upon SARS in order to bring about the successful 
recovery of tax from taxpayers. It is these statutory mechanisms that operate in conjunction 
with the rule that make it a success. The dissertation entailed a discussion of the powers 
bestowed upon SARS in the statutory mechanisms as compared to the rights of taxpayers. 
The findings of this research work, in terms of the various arguments from the literature, 
indicate that as far as the rule is concerned, the mechanisms in the Tax Administration Act, as 
well as the decisions of the courts are primarily aimed at assisting SARS to successfully execute 
its tax collection mandate. This is not to say that the said statute takes no cognisance of the 
need to protect taxpayers’ rights. Its recognition of taxpayers’ rights is evidenced by the 
provision of taxpayers’ remedies to lodge objections and appeals against SARS’s decisions, to 
request for suspension of payment of disputed taxes as well as provision providing for a number 
of avenues at which taxpayers may refer complaints and disputes. Nonetheless, these avenues 
do not confer any new rights upon taxpayers. As is implicit in the rule itself, the draconian 
nature of the powers bestowed upon SARS remains. In other words, the said remedies do not 
offer adequate protection to taxpayers and the possibility of taxpayers experiencing hardship, 
financial or otherwise, is always present. 
A further finding is that a measure of uncertainty persists in view of the conflicting High Court 
decisions, particularly on the issue whether a certified statement constitutes a judgment 
obtained by SARS in the absence of a taxpayer.1  The issue remains to be authoritatively 
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decided either by a full bench of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal or the 
Constitutional Court. 
In addition, although the Constitutional Court affirmed the constitutionality of the rule in a 
VAT dispute,2 some academics hold the view that a different result would ensue in an income 
tax dispute whilst others are not persuaded that the Constitutional Court would decide 
differently in an income tax dispute, as discussed in chapter three. Taxpayers and SARS alike 
wait with bated breath for a possible ruling of the apex court to settle the debate.  
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Tax legislation, such as the Tax Administration Act is manifestly complex and is not easily 
understood by many taxpayers.3 The need for certainty cannot be overemphasised as it will 
assist taxpayers in the quest to protect their rights. Therefore, it is recommended that proper 
meanings and definitions within the Tax Administration Act be accorded to the phrases and 
terms in section 164. This will assist in eliminating the problems of interpretation and enable 
SARS to properly exercise its discretion, as well as the taxpayer to know what to expect when 
invoking their rights under this section. 
The Tax Administration Act provides time frames within which taxpayers must utilise their 
remedies. However, the legislature omitted to provide a period in section 164 within which 
SARS must consider a suspension request and respond to the taxpayer.4  Therefore, it is further 
recommended that the Tax Administration Act contain a time frame within which SARS must 
respond to taxpayers in respect of suspension of payment requests. 
Although the Constitutional Court has held that the legislature contemplated the protection of 
the right of access to the courts through the establishment of the Tax Court,5 its decisions are 
not binding as seen from the discussion in chapter four. It is further recommended that the 
decisions of the Tax Court, as a court of first instance and in respect of the merits of a dispute, 
become binding in the interest of creating legal certainty for both SARS and taxpayers. Its 
decisions should form judicial precedent until such time that a decision is subsequently found 
to be incorrect and overruled. 
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In view of the need to raise greater awareness of taxpayers’ rights, it is further recommended 
that a Tax Payer Bill of Rights be put in place.6  This is because although the Tax 
Administration Act contains taxpayers’ rights, the complex wording of the statute might not be 
easily understandable to all taxpayers.7  This will also promote a spirit of transparency and 
assist to enhance the confidence of taxpayers in SARS.8 
As explained in chapter four, the Public Protector lacks personnel with the requisite tax 
expertise in order to handle complaints of a tax nature.9 In view of the crucial role of the Public 
Protector, it is further recommended that personnel with the requisite tax expertise be employed 
by the office of the Public Protector. This will enhance the said office’s oversight role over 
SARS as an organ of state in the battle to fight against the misuse of power by the State. 
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